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INTRODUCTION
On December 15, 1979, President Carter announced
his intention to recognize and establish diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of China CPRC). 1
In a separate statement, the President indicated that
on January 1, 1979, the United States would notify
Taiwan that it would terminate diplomatic relations
with the Republic of China (ROC) and would terminate
the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and
the ROC which had entered into force March 3, 1955.2
One week after his public announcements, the President
wrote the following letter to the Secretary of State:
"Please deliver to the Republic of China a notice under
Article X of the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty of
19 5 4 to effect termination of the treaty.one year after
January 1, 1979. "3
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; B.A.,
St. Patrick's College, 1963; S.T.L., Gregorian University, 1967;
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LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1976.
1. 14 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 2264 (Dec. 18, 1978). The
texts of President Carter's statement and of other relevant docu-
ments are reprinted in Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., Termination of Treaties 320-28 (Comm. Print 1978).
For a concise statement of the events leading up to the normaliza-
tion of United States relations with the People's Republic of
China, see Scheffer, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to
the United States De-Recognition of the Republic of China. 19 Harv.
Int'l L.J. 931-44 (1978).
2, 6 UST. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178, 238 U.N.T.S. 213.
3. Defendantts Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories,
Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979), Pursuant to
President Carter's instruction, Acting Secretary of State Warren
Christopher signed the notice of termination on December 23, 1978.
The notice was transmitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Taipei and to the Embassy of the ROC in Washington on the same day.
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
On the same day the President acted to set in mo-
tion the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with
the ROC, United States Senator Barry Goldwater, joined
by six other Senators and eight members of the House of
Representatives,4 filed suit in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia, naming the President and
the Secretary of State as defendants. The relief sought
by the plaintiffs was a declaration that the President's
attempt to terminate unilaterally the treaty with the
ROC was "unconstitutional, illegal, null and void,"5
and that "any decision of the United States to terminate
the [Mutual] Defense Treaty must be made by and with the
full consultation of the entire Congress, and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, or with the approval
of both Houses of Congress." 6 The plaintiffs sought an
injunction preventing the President and the Secretary of
State "from taking any further action or making any
statements which will have the effect of terminating, or
creating any expectations that the [Mutual] Defense
Treaty has been or will be terminated," 7 at least until
such time as the President might secure the advice and
consent of the Senate or the approval of both Houses of
Congress concerning the termination of this treaty.
When the 96th Congress convened, several Senators
introduced resolutions concerning the appropriate role
of the Senate and the Congress in treaty termination
generally or concerning the termination of the Mutual
Defense Treaty with Taiwan in particular. 8 On the open-
ing day of the new Congress, January 15, 1979, Senator
Harry F. Byrd proposed the following resolution:
4. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1-2,
Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979)[hereinafter
cited as Complaint]. The co-plaintiff Senators were Strom Thurmond,
Carl Curtis, Jake Garn, Orrin Hatch, Jesse A. Helms, and Gordon
Humphrey. The co-plaintiff Members of the House were Robert Bauman,
Steve Symms, Larry McDonald, Robert Daniel, Jr., Bob Stump, Eldon
Rudd, John Ashbrook, and George Hansen. Goldwater was later joined
in this action by Senators Paul Laxalt and James McClure and by
Congressmen John Rousselot, Robert Dornan, Don Young, Newt Gingrich,
James Collins, Mickey Edwards, Dan Quayle, Clair Burgener, and Ken
B. Kramer. Amended Complaint, Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp.
949 (D.D.C. 1979).
5. Complaint, supra note 4, at 14,
6. Id., at 15.
7. Id. at 14,
8. Goldwater v. Carter, (D.D.C., June 6, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Opinion of June 6, 1979], reprinted in 125 Cong, Rec.
S7050-52 and 7062-64 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
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It is the sense of the Senate that
approval by the Senate of the United
States is required to terminate any
mutual defense treaty between the
United States and another nation,9
Senator Byrd presented his resolution as an amendment to
the Taiwan Relations Act,10 and this resolution, known as
the "Byrd Amendment," was debated in the Senate on March
7 and 8, 1979.11 In the course of this debate, Senator
Byrd agreed to withdraw the resolution as an amendment to
the Taiwan Act on the strength of an unusual unanimous
consent agreement to refer the resolution to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee with instructions to report
to the Senate on the matter no later than May 1, 1979.12
On April 9, 10, and 12, 1979, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee conducted hearings on the Byrd
resolution and on other matters related to treaty
termination.13 The Committee hired Professor Louis
Henkin of Columbia University School of Law to serve as
a consultant for its hearings and to assist in the pre-
paration of its report.14 The Committee heard from six-
teen witnesses, including Senators Byrd and Goldwater,
Most of the other witnesses either currently serve or
had previously served in the State Department or in the
Department of Justice. The Committee also received
9. S. Res. 15, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong, Rec, S220
(daily ed. Jan, 18, 1979).
10, Unprinted amendment No. 30 to S, 245, subsequently
numbered amendment No. 93, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec.
S2147 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1979). This bill, without the Byrd amend-
ment, was enacted into law on April 10, 1979. 22 U.S.C. § 3301-16
(1979).
11. 125 Cong. Rec. S2147-63 Cdaily ed. Mar. 7, 1979) and
S2297-305 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1979).
12. 125 Cong. Rec. S2302-04 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1979).
13. Treaty Termination: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations on S. Res. 15, 96th Cong., 1st Sess, (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Treaty Termination].
14. Although Professor Henkin participated in the selection
of the witnesses who appeared before the Committee and in the May 1,
1979 committee -meeting to markup S. Res. 15 (see Treaty Termination
Resolution, S. Rep. No. 119, 96th Cong,, 1st Sess. 32-33, 35-36, 38,
40-41, 46-47 (1979)), Professor Henkin has -modestly stated that he
can "claim neither credit nor responsibility for that report or for
the resolution it proposed." Henkin, Litigating the President's
Power to Terminate Treaties, 73 Am. J. Int"l L. 647, 654 n. 35
(1979).
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statements from four other professors of law or history.1 5
On May 1, 1979, the Committee met to mark up the
Byrd resolution, and on May 7 it issued its report on
treaty termination.1 6 In this report the Committee
unanimously rejected the position "advanced by Adminis-
tration witnesses that the President possesses an 'im-
pliedt power to terminate any treaty, with any country,
under any circumstances, irrespective of what action may
have been taken by the Congress by law or by the Senate
in a reservation to that treaty."17 The Committee did
not, however, agree with Senator Byrd's approach to
treaty termination.18 Instead it recommended that the
Senate adopt the following resolution:
That it is the sense of the Senate that
treaties or treaty provisions to which
the United States is a party should not
be terminated or suspended by the
President without the concurrence of
the Congress except where --
15, These witnesses included the Hon. Herbert Brownell,
former Attorney General; the Hon. Dean Rusk, former Secretary of
State; the Hon. William D. Rogers, former Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs; the Hon. Herbert J. Hansell,
Legal Advisor, Department of State; Professor Abram Chayes, former
Legal Advisor, Department of State: Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
former Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State; Professor John
Norton Moore, former Counselor on International Law, Department of
State; Lawrence A. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice; the present author,
who served in the Justice Department under Attorneys General Levi
and Bell; Professor Charles E. Rice, Notre Dame Law School;
Professor Arthur Bestor, Professor Emeritus of History, U/niversity
of Washington; and Professor Irwin S. Rhodes, editor of the papers
of John Marshall.
16. S. Rep. No. 119, supra note 14.
17. Id. at 6.
18. Id. at 7-8.
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1. the treaty provisions in question
have been superseded by a subsequent,
inconsistent statute or treaty, or
2. material breach, changed circum-
stances, or other factors recognized by
international law, or provisions of the
treaty itself, give rise to a right of
termination or suspension on the part
of the United States; but in no event
where such termination or suspension
would ---
(A) result in the imminent involve-
ment of United States Armed Forces
in hostilities or otherwise seriously
and directly endanger the security of
the United States; or
CB) be inconsistent with the provisions
of--
Ci) a condition set forth in the
resolution of ratification of a particu-
lar treaty; or
Cii) a joint resolution, specifying
a procedure for the termination or sus-
pension of such treaty.19
While the Byrd, Goldwater, and Committee resolutions
were pending--indeed on the very day when these resolu-
tions were being debated in the Senate, June 6, 1979--
Judge Gasch entered an order in Goldwater v. Carter,
dismissing the lawsuit without prejudice on the juris-
dictional ground that the case was not yet ripe for
judicial resolution:
The Court believes that the extra-
ordinary remedy of injunction or the
related power of a declaration should
be exercised sparingly and only when
the legislative branch has been given
the opportunity of acting. At least
three resolutions are presently pending
in the Senate. For these reasons the
Court believes that the resolution of
19. Id. at 1.
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the ultimate issue in this case should
in the first instance be in the legis-
lative forum. If the Congress approves
the President's action, the issue
presently before the Court would be
moot. If the Senate or the Congress
takes action, the result of which falls
short of approving the President's
termination effort, then the contro-
versy will be ripe for a judicial
declaration respecting the Presidentts
authority to act unilaterally. Until
then, the complaint is dismissed
without prejudice.20
Within hours of this initial ruling, which was in-
corporated into the Senate debate both by Senator
Goldwater2l and by Senator Church,2 2 the Senate adopted
the Byrd resolution by a vote of 59 to 35.
On the strength of this action in the Senate, the
plaintiffs in the Goldwater litigation filed a motion
on June 12, 1979, to alter or amend the judgment.23 On
June 29 the Justice Department lawyers recorded their
opposition to this motion on the grounds that the plain-
tiffs still "lack[ed] standing to sue under the terms of
the Court's June 6 ruling and that even if they did have
standing, they would not be entitled to judgment in
their favor since this case presents a non-justiciable
political treaty with Taiwan and was a valid exercise of
[the President's] constitutional authority." 24
It became plain in the weeks following the Senate
vote on June 6 that Senator Goldwater was clearly
20. Opinion of June 6, 1979, supra note 8, 125 Cong. Rec. at
S7051 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
21. 125 Cong. Rec. S7050-52 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
22. Id. at S7062-64.
23. Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment of
June 6, 1979, Goldwater v, Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979)
24. Defendantst Opposition to Plaintiffs' NMotion to Alter or
Amend the Judgment of June 6, 1979, Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp.
949 (D.D C. 1979) Ihereinafter cited as Defendants' Opposition].
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opposed to delay tactics,2 5 while the leadership of the
Senate, including the Majority Leader, Senator Robert
C. Byrd,2 6 the Chairman of the Senate Foreign
25. For example, on June 18, 1979, Senator Goldwater stated:
Now, I do not know what the pleasure of the
majority leader will be, but I ... have been
ready, and am ready to submit this matter to
a vote ... this afternoon. I would rather
do it right now, but if that is not the pleasure
of my friend from West Virginia, and he is the
bossman around here, I just want to make it
perfectly clear that this is not being held up
by dilatory tactics from my group that represents
my feelings.
125 Cong. Rec. S7861 (daily ed. June 18, 1979).
26. For example, on June 6, the majority leader postponed
consideration of the amendment offered by Senators Church and
Javits, although Senator Goldwater argued that he did "not see one
bit of good in putting it off another day, two days, or a week"
and that the Senate was "ready to vote right now." 125 Cong. Rec.
S7059 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
On June 18, 1979, when the Senate resumed consideration of
the treaty termination issue, the majority leader did not press for
a vote either on the Church-Javits amendment or on the substitute
amendment offered by Senator Goldwater. Id. at S7862. Similarly,
when the Goldwater substitute amendment became the pending business
of the Senate on June 21, the majority leader did not seek a vote.
Id. at S8189-95. Indeed, on that day, without consulting the author
of the amendment, the majority leader took the whole issue of trea-
ty termination indefinitely out of pending business by returning the
matter to the Senate calendar. See Senate Pulls Back Treaties
Resolution, Wash. Post, June 22, 1979, at A13, col. 1.
Judge Gasch had instructed the parties to keep him apprised of
the progress (or lack of progress) in the Senate developments. The
President's attorneys did so by submitting to the court an affidavit
by the Senate Parliamentarian, Murray Zweben, to the effect that the
vote of June 6 was not "the final action of the Senate" and that "it
is also possible that the Senate will not take final action on S.
Res. 15; or, if it is acted upon, it could be defeated, or tabled,
or postponed indefinitely, any of which would kill the resolution,"
Declaration of Murray Zweben at 4, submitted on June 29 with Defen-
dants' Opposition, supra note 23.
On October 17, 1979, Judge Gasch ruled in favor of the plain-
tiffs. Relying on an account of this decision in The Washington
Post, the majority leader suggested that the Judge was "misinformed"
and in "absolute error" for construing the action on June 6 and the
subsequent inaction of the Senate on the treaty termination issue as
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Relations Committee, Senator Frank Church, 2 7 and the
26. (Continued)
an intimation of the Senate's "view that the Taiwan Treaty could
not be terminated." 125 Cong. Rec. S14769 (daily ed. October 18,
1979).
Actually, Judge Gasch was well aware of the state of affairs
on Capitol Hill. In his October 17 order, he noted that after the
initial vote on the Byrd amendment, "additional amendments were
proposed by Senator Church ... and by Senator Goldwater .... " In
mild understatement, the Judge continued:
Neither amendment came up for a vote, and Senate
Resolution 15 as amended by Senator Harry F. Byrd's
language has been returned to the Senate calendar
without further action. The vote in favor of the Byrd
amendment does not constitute final action by
the Senate, although it stands as the last expression
of Senate position on its constitutional role in the
treaty termination process. By that vote, the Senate
rejected a Committee substitute that would have ex-
pressly approved of the action taken by the Presi-
dent in terminating this treaty. No further steps
have been taken by the Senate with respect to treaty
termination powers.
The action taken by the Senate has admittedly
not been decisive. It does, however, evidence at
least some congressional determination to participate
in the process whereby a mutual defense treaty is
terminated, and clearly falls short of approving
the President's termination effort.
Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 954 (D.D.C. 1979) (footnote
omitted).
On October 20, 1979, the majority leader called a news con-
ference at which he announced his opinion that the Senate ought to
vote 'expeditiously' to end the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan,
and at the same time should outline its role in terminating future
treaties. See Byrd Urges Senate to Vote an End to Taiwan Treaty,
The Wash. Post, October 21, 1979, at A30., col. 1. Senator Gold-
water immediately informed the majority leader that he welcomed
his development, that he was prepared to keep an open mind on the
merits of terminating the Taiwan treaty, and that he would not fili-
buster or otherwise delay an up or down vote on the matter. Per-
haps because of the rapid pace of events after October 2G, the
majority leader never took any action to effectuata the concerns he
had voiced in his October 20 news conference.
27. On June 18, 1979, Senator Church spoke against voting
that day on the Goldwater substitute amendment to the Church-Javits
amendment: "I think we would all be well served to give the Senate
an opportunity to reflect upon this before pressing it to a vote."
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ranking minority member of that committee, Senator
Jacob Javits,2 8 appeared to be opposed to allowing a
definitive vote on the matter. Perhaps for this reason,
on October 17, 1979, Jadge Gasch granted the plaintiffs'
motion to alter or amend his judgment of June 6. Judge
Gasch discusses at length the difficult questions of
justiciability presented in the litigation and found no
obstacle either in the standing doctrine2 9 or the politi-
cal question doctrine3 0 to reaching the merits of the case.
In deciding the case on the merits, the Judge declared
that President Carter's notice of termination of the
1954 Mutual Defense Treaty was ineffective as a matter
of constitutional law because it lacked the authority
of congressional participation in some form. According-
ly, the Judge enjoined Secretary of State Vance and his
subordinate officers from taking any action to implement
the President's notice of termination until congression-
al approval to effectuate such notice was secured.31
27. (Continued)
125 Cong. Rec. S7862 (daily ed. June 18, 1979). In a debate three
days later, Senator Goldwater responded:
We will have a situation where once again this
whole thing gets put off until next week and
then next week we will find that ... this subject
will be pushed aside again. I am anxious to
bring this to a close. I am anxious to get a
determination on it. It has been since the
15th of January. So I seriously and sincerely
hope that my friend from New York [Senator
Javits] and my friend from Idaho [Senator Church]
will agree to a time certain to vote this after-
noon on this amendment.
Id. at S8190 (daily ed. June 21, 1979). In the course of the ensuing
debate with Senator Goldwater, Senator Church refused to agree to a
time for a vote, arguing instead:
Under the circumstances and until the 100 Senators have
had an opportunity to read these debates or participate
in them to examine the true ramifications involved in
the substitute now before us, I think it would be un-
wise to vote. I do not believe we should rush to a
vote when it is entirely possible that large numbers
of Senators have not fully informed themselves as
to the true nature of this issue before us.
Id. at S8191.
28. See id. at S8191-95 (remarks of Senator Javits in opposi-
tion to the Goldwater amendment).
29. 481 F. Supp. 949, 951-56 (D.D.C. 1979).
30. Id. at 956-58.
31 Id. at 965.
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On November 13, 1979, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit heard on
an expedited basis the defendants' appeal from Judge
Gasch's order. The D.C. Circuit is accustomed to a
leisurely pace of decision making, often keeping parties
waiting for up to two years before it discloses its
judgment and publishes its opinions. Sensing the urgen-
cy of the Goldwater case, however, the judges on the
D.C. Circuit announced their judgment in this case more
swiftly than is their wont. 32  On November 30, 1979,
the Court issued a thirty-one page per curiam order,
agreeing with Judge Gasch on the justiciability issues
presented by the case, but disagreeing with Judge Gasch
and reversing him on the merits. The appellate court
framed the central issue before it as follows:
The constitutional issue we face ... is solely
and simply the one of whether the President
in [the] precise circumstances lof the
Mutual Defense Treaty] is, on behalf of
the United States, empowered to terminate
the Treaty in accordance with its terms.
It is our view that he is, and that the
limitations which the District Court pur-
ported to place on his action in this regard
have no foundation in the Constitution.33
32. On rare occasions involving constitutional crises of
some magnitude, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
expedites the hearing and announces its decision swiftly. See,
e.g._ l-nited States v. Washington Post, 446 F. 2d 1327 (D.C. Cir.),
aff'd, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), discussed in text accompanying notes
254-64 infra.
Perhaps partly because of the circuit court's reputation for
deliberateness, the Supreme Court has, on rare occasions, been wil-
ling to review the judgment of the district court without waiting
for the opinion of the circuit court. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet
and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), discussed in text
accompanying notes 245-53 infra; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974), discussed in text accompanying notes 265-71 infra.
33. Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246, 48 U.S.L.W. 2380 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 30, 1979), quoted in Appendix to Petition for A Writ of
Certiorari at 3A-4A, Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979).
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Chief Judge Skelly Wright, joined by Judge Tamm, con-
curred in the result reached by the majority, but dis-
agreed with their colleagues on the standing issue and
would have vacated the District Court's opinion and
ordered the complaint to be dismissed solely on the
grounds that the plaintiffs-appellees lacked standing to
bring the action in the first place.3 4  Judge MacKinnon
issued a sixty page opinion, concurring with his col-
leagues' reversal of Judge Gasch's order forbidding
presidential treaty termination without the consent of
the Senate by a two-thirds vote, but dissenting from
his colleagues' reversal of Gasch's order forbidding
presidential treaty termination without the consent of
a majority of both Houses of Congress:
The appetite of the presidential
office will be whetted by the court's
decision today. In future years a
voracious President and Department of
State may easily use this grant of
absolute power to the President to
develop other excuses to feed upon
congressional prerogatives that a Con-
gress lacking in vigilance allows to
lapse into desuetude.
I would instead preserve the con-
gressional function of treaty termina-
tion, recognizing that exercise of this
power requires a majority vote of
Congress and the approval of the
President. Accordingly, I respectfully
dissent and would affirm the decision
of the District Court to the extent that
it requires an Act of Congress and
approval thereto by the President.3 5
The D.C. Circuit's opinion was issued on Friday,
November 30, 1979. On the following Monday, December 3,
the attorneys for the plaintiffs-appellees filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, argu-
ing that the Court should hear the Goldwater case be-
cause it involved an important question of constitution-
al law which had not been, but should be, settled by the
34. Id., at IQ4A-1O5A (emphasis supplied ) CWright, J., con-
curringl .
35. Id. Cemphasis in original)(footnote omitted).
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Supreme Court,3 6 and because the appellate court's
opinion had expanded the concept of the President's
Foreign Affairs Power on an unprecedented scale. 37
Three days later the Solicitor General, Wade H. McCree,
filed a brief for the respondents, opposing the grant-
ing of certiorari in the case, and arguing both that the
appellate court was correct on the merits and that the
court should not have reached the merits because the
plaintiffs-petitioners lacked standing to pursue the liti-
gation and because the case prsented a nonjusticiable
political question. 38
Two days later the petitioners filed a reply brief
and on December 12 they filed a supplemental brief. On
the following day, December 13, 1979, the GoZdwater
litigation came to an abrupt halt. In a terse per
curiam order, the Supreme Court granted the petition for
certiorari, summarily vacated the judgment of the
appellate court, and remanded the case to the District
Court with directions to dismiss the complaint. 39  Only
Justices White and Blackmun voted to set the case for
36. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-l3, Goldwater v.
Carter, 100 S.Ct. 533 (l79)(mem.); See Rule 19(i) (b) Rules of
the Supreme Court,
37. Id. at 13-31.
38. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, Goldwater v.
Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533 '(1979)(Tem.) thereinafter cited as Brief for
Respondants]. The Solicitor General was joined on this brief by
Alice Daniel, the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division,
Peter Buscemi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, and three Justice
Department attorneys, Robert Kopp, Michael Hertz, and Linda Cole.
In addition to arguing on standing and political question grounds,
they claimed that the "severe time constraints under which the
Court would inevitably labor in seeking to render an effective
decision on the merits of the current controversy provide an
additional reason why petitioners' request for further review
should be denied." Id. at 8. The respondents based this claim
on the view that unless the Court provided injunctive relief before
January 1, 1980, the case would become moot because the treaty
would, under international law, be irrevocably terminated on that
date, "regardless of any subsequent judicial holding that the
United States internal procedures for arriving at the decision to
terminate were deficient." Id. See 5 G. Hackworth, Digest of
International Law 328 C1943). But see text accompanying note 40
Tnfra.
39. Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct, 533 (19791.
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argument and give it plenary consideration. As Justice
Blackmun wrote:
In my view, the time factor and its
importance are illusory; if the
President does not have the power to
terminate the Treaty Ca substantial
issue we should address only after
briefing and oral argument), the
notice of intention to terminate surely
has no legal effect. It is also in-
defensible, without further study, to
pass on the issue of justiciability or 4
on the issues of standing or ripeness.A
Justice Rehnquist, who had supervised legal analysis
of the treaty termination issue while serving as Assis-
tant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel in
the Nixon-Mitchell Justice Department, wrote a plurality
opinion joined by the Chief Justice,41 and by Justices
Stewart and Stevens, which adopted the posture that the
Goldwater case presented a "political question" and was
"nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of the
President ii the conduct of our country's foreign
relations .,,2  The plurality opinion written by Justice
Rehnquist did not even bother to discuss the leading
case on the political question doctrine, Baker v. Carr.43
Justice Rehnquist surely overstated his case when he
40. Id. at 539 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
41. One of the plaintiffs in the GolMwater case stated to the
present author on April 11, 1979 that the Chief Justice had pri-
vately indicated to him that "we [the Justices of the Supreme Court]
will have to decide your case." Assuming that this report is ac-
curate, I am of the opinion that it was of dubious propriety for
the Chief Justice to have intimated even this much of an opinion
on a case so likely to reach the Supreme Court for adjudication.
See Canon 17, Canons of Judicial Ethics (ex parte communications).
In light of the Chief Justice's vote in Goldwater one can infer
either that he changed his mind after the April 1979 conversation
with one of the plaintiffs in the case, or that he
had in mind a tortuous sense of the term "to decide" (viz. the
power of the Court to decide that it lacked the power to decide).
Or, perhaps, the Chief Justice never said what the plaintiff told
this author he had said.
42. 100 S. Ct. at 536-38 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
43. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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suggested that federal courts have no role whatever in
cases involving the "authority of the Presidept in the
conduct of our country's foreign relations." 4 In any
event, the full weight of such a sweeping view cannot be
sustained solely by the two slender reeds relied on by
Rehnquist: Coleman v. Miller,4 5 a 1939 case having
nothing whatever to do either with foreign affairs or
with a critical conflict over the allocation of power be-
tween the President and e Congress, and United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., R a 1936 case now remembered
for an overstated dictum by Justice George Sutherland to
the effect that the Executive enjoys a sort of constitu-
tional hegemony over "external" or "foreign affairs."
Both Justice Brennan, the author of the Court's
opinion in Baker v. Carr, and Justice Powell repudiated
the Rehnquist plurality view of the political question
doctrine. For Justice Brennan, the plurality opinion
"profoundly misapprehends the political question princi-
ple as it applies to matters of foreign relations. "47
Justice Powell likewise repudiated the suggestion that
the treaty termination issue should .ways be viewed as
a nonjusticiable political question, for Powell could
not reconcile this view with any of the relevant and
recent precedents on political question, including Baker
v. Carr, Powell v. McCormack,49 United States v. Nixon,5 0
and Buckley v. Valeo.51
Justice Powell, however, concurred in the per curiam
order dismissing the complaint on the sole ground that
44. 100 S. Ct. at 536 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
45. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
46. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See discussion in text accompanying
notes 120-27 and 230-37 infra.
47. 100 S. Ct. at 539 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 534-36 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell cited Bren-
nan's statement in Baker v. Carr that "it is error to suppose that
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies be-
yond judicial cognizance." 369 U.S. at 211. See also L. Henkin,
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 214-15 (1972); Henkin, Is There
a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 Yale L.J, 597 (1976); Scharpf,
Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis,
75 Yale L.J. 517 (1966).
49. 397 U.S. 486, 519 (1969).
50. 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
51. 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976).
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the issue presen ed in Goldwater was not yet ripe for
judicial review. 2  Only Justice Brennan voted in
Goldwater to reach the merits. In so doing, he would
have decided the constitutional question of the alloca-
tion of power to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty
with the ROC in favor of the Executive on the ground
that the treaty termination power is within "the Presi-
dent's well-established authority to recognize, and
withdraw recognition from, foreign governments." 5 3
In light of the rather off-hand treatment given the
Goldwater case by a badly fragmented Supreme Court, it
would appear that Professor Laurence H. Tribe's diagnosis
of the case as a "constitutional red herring"54 was not
52. 100 S.Ct. at 534 (Powell J., concurring) "It cannot be
said that either the Senate or the House has rejected the President's
claim. If the Congress chooses not to confront the President, it
is not our task to do so."
53. Id. at 539 (Bcennan, J., dissenting).
54. Tribe, Goldoater v. Carter: A Constitutional Red Her-
ring. The New Republic, (Mar. 17, 1979), [hereinafter cited as
Constitutional Red Herring]. In this brief piece Professor Tribe
asserts that the case for mandatory congressional involvement is
stronger when the termination of a commercial treaty is at issue
than when the fate of a defense pact is involved. The basis for
this remarkable opinion is surely not the constitutional text,
which does not differentiate among treaties when it describes them
as part of the supreme law of the land. U.S. Const. art VI. More-
over, Tribe's opinion cannot be squared with historical precedents
asserted by the State Department to be the basis for an absolute
executive power over treaty termination, and Tribe himself would
apparently not welcome the result of a court opinion accepting
this extravagant claim. Nor does Tribe's view hold up when scruti-
nized in the light of the more careful research on this subject
done by such eminent historians as Arthur Bestor, Richard Morris,
and Irwin Rhodes. Finally, Tribe's opinion is at odds with his own
arguments in support of a broader congressional voice in foreign
policy matters. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 172-81
(1978) Thereinafter L. Tribe].
It seems clear that Tribe has modified his absolutist per-
spective on presidential power to terminate treaties. Compare L.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law 164-65 (1978), with Constitutional
Red Herring, supra, at 16. It is, however, regrettable that the
Presidentts attorneys were apparently unaware of this development in
Tribe's thought, for they cited the -unsupported assertion in his
1978 treatise as authority for exclusive presidential responsibility
for terminating treaties. Brief for Appellants at 50 Goldwater v.
Carter, No. 79-2246, 48 -U.S.L.W. 2380 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellants].
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wide of the mark, at least as far as the Justices were
concerned. On the other hand, the care and seriousness
with which the issue of appropriate allocation of con-
stitutional power in treaty termination was treated by
nearly all the major actors 5 5 in this .case prior to its
summary dismissal by the Supreme Court suggests that it
presented structural questions concerning our constitu-
tional order of the utmost importance for our republic.
These questions will not disappear merely because a
majority of the Justices have chosen on this occasion to
behave like ostriches. In my opinion, the significant
questions left unresolved in Goldwater include the fol-
lowing:
(1) Who may raise the issue of the consti-
tutional allocation of power to terminate
a treaty (the question of standing)?
(2) Who shall decide how this power is to
be allocated and how the process of treaty
termination is to be effectuated within
our constitutional order (the political
question doctrine)?
(3) What can we learn from the past about
this issue (the historical problem)?
55. During the debate on the Taiwan Relations Act, the Senate
Majority Leader entered into an unusual unanimous consent agreement
to allow an up or down vote on the congressional role in treaty
termination within sixty days. The Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee hired a prominent scholar, Professor Louis Henkin, to serve
as a consultant on treaty termination and held hearings on this
subject for three days in April. The committee unanimously repu-
diated the Executive's assertion of exclusive control over the
entire process of treaty termination, but the language offered by
a majority of the committee was closely scrutinized by the entire
Senate, which voted 59 to 35 in favor of the Byrd amendment instead
of the committee version. Both the June 6 and the October 17
opinions of Judge Gasch are careful, reflective deliberations which
suggest that he regarded the case as more than a "red herring."
Likewise, the willingness of the entire circuit court to grant
expedited en bane review of Judge Gaschts opinion, as well as the
thoughtful and prompt consideration which the circuit judges gave
the case in opinions totalling 105 pages, would suggest that these
judges viewed the k12zmater litigation as raising substantive con-
stitutional questions of some moment.
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(4) Would any principles of our consti-
tutional order be threatened by judicial
approval of the absolute claims of power
made by the Executive in this case (the
problem of separation of powers)?
(5) Would a resolution of this case in
favor of absolute executive power be a good
precedent for the future conduct of American
foreign policy in an increasingly inter-
dependent world (the question of the role
of the people in the formation of public
policy)?
Each of these questions is implicated in this case,
and none is susceptible of simple, unequivocal responses.
This article elaborates a response to each question in
light of the arguments made in Goldwater.
I. THE STANDING QUESTION: WHO MAY RAISE THE ISSUE OF
ALLOCATION OF POWER TO TERMINATE A TREATY?
A. TAXPAYER STANDING
In Frothingham v. MeZlon,56 a wealthy taxpayer out-
raged at the distribution of federal dollars to state
programs designed to reduce maternal and infant mortal-
ity sued to enjoin Secretary of the Treasury Andrew J.
Mellon from carrying out the Maternity Act of 1921.57
Raising an objection to the act on the basis of vertical
separation of powers, Frothingham's attorney, William
Rawls, argued that the Court had often permitted consti-
tutional challenges to the validity of legislation by a
single member of a large class affected by an arguably
invalid law.58 Rawls noted further that in Bradfield v.
Roberts59 the right of a taxpayer to maintain a suit to
enjoin an allegedly unauthorized payment of public
moneys from the Treasury of the United States had been
56. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
57. Pub. L. No. 67-69, 42 Stat. 224 (1921).
58. 262 U.S. at 475, citing Hammer v. Dagenhart, 274 U.S. 251
(1918), Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), and Millard v. Roberts,
202 U.S. 429 (1906).
59. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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expressly adjudicated by the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia and that the Supreme Court had de-
cided the case on the meri.ts without discussing the is-
sue of taxpayer standing.O0 The direct injury alleged
by Frothingham was that she would be subjected to taxa-
tion to pay her proportionate part of allegedly unau-
thorized or impermissible payments. Given the economic
views of a majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court,
Rawls must have expected these arguments to be power-
fully persuasive, at least to Chief Justice Taft, and
Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and
Butler. But to Frothingham's dismay, Justice Suther-
land wrote for a unanimous Court:
The party who invokes the [judicial]
power must be able to show not only that
the statute is invalid but that she sus-
tained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as the
result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers in some indefinite way in
common with people generally.... Here the
parties plaintiff have no such case. 61
In the wake of popular discontent with Engel v.
Vitale 62 (Regent's school prayer case) and Abington
School District v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett6 3 (the
Bible eading cases), the Supreme Court in FZast v.
Cohen 6° lowered the Frothingham barrier to allow federal
taxpayers to challenge a federal statute on the grounds
that it violates the religion clauses of the First
Amendment. With this sole exception, Frothingham still
states a generalized rule against taxpayer standing.
This rule was reaffirmed in two 1974 decisions, United
States v. Richardson 65 and Schlesinger v. Reservists
60. 262 U.S. at 476, citing Roberts v. Bradfield, 12 App. D.C.
453 (1898).
61. Id. at 488. Justice Sutherland distinguished BradfieZd as
a suit against a municipal corporation, id. at 486; he ignored the
other cases cited in note 57 supra.
62. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
63. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). For an analysis of the reaction to
these cases, see Beaney & Beiser, Prayer in Politics: The Impact
of Engel and Schempp on the Political Process, in The Impact of
Supreme Court Decisions 22-36 (T. Becker & M. Feeley eds. 2d ed.
1973).
64. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
65. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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Committee to Stop the War.
66
B. LEGISLATOR STANDING
Keenly aware that access to the federal courts on
the treaty termination issue cannot be gained merely by
asserting "generalized grievances about the conduct of
government or the allocation of power in the Federal
System,"67 the plaintiffs in Goldwater v. Carter studi-
ously avoided mentioning in their complaint that they
were taxpayers or citizens. Instead, the plaintiffs'
strategy on the standing question was to rely primarily
on the rationale in Kennedy v. Sampson,6 8 that a Member
of Congress could be said to be injured in fact by an
arguably unlawful act or omission of the Executive which
depriyed the Member of Congress of his or her right to
vote. 9 Senator Goldwater, for example, is described
in the complaint filed in the district court:
Plaintiff Senator Barry Goldwater
is a United States Senator from the State
of Arizona, and has his official address
in the District of Columbia. Senator
Goldwater sues herein in support of his
constitutional right to vote and otherwise
to give his advice and consent with respect
to the termination of the 1954 Treaty with
the Republic of China, and in support of his
sworn duty to preserve, protect, and defend
the Constitutional allocation of powers to
the Executive and Legislative branches of
the federal government. Senator Goldwater
was a member of the Senate in 1955 at the
time the Mutual Defense Treaty was submitted
66. 418 U.S. 208 (1974); see also Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F.
Supp. 846 (D.Kan. 1968), aff'd sub nom. Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F. 2d
236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970) (private
citizen lacks standing to sue President for conducting an unde-
clared war in Southeast Asia).
67. 418 U.S. at 173.
68. 511 F. 2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
69. Id. at 433-36. The gist of Senator Kennedy's complaint
was that President Nixon's "pocket veto" over a Christmas recess
of the Congress had unconstitutionally nullified the Senator's vote
in favor of the bill in question, and had deprived him of an op-
portunity to override the President's veto.
1979]
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
to the Senate for its advice and
consent. g0
This strategy had the obvious strength of placing
the plaintiffs in a different category than private
citizens alleging generalized grievances, but it suf-
fered from the weakness that few legislators since
Kennedy have prevailed in their claim of access to the
federal courts.]1 At the outset it should be recognized
that Judge Gasch noted in his memorandum opinion of
October 17 that "no special standards govern congres-
sional standing questions." 7 2 Hence he applied the four
standards governing standing generally: (1) has the
plaintiff suffered injury in fact?; (2) are the inter-
ests asserted within the zone of interests to be pro-
tected by the Constitution?; (3) is the injury caused by
the challenged action?; (4) is the injury capable of
being redressed by a favorable judicial decision? 7 3
1. INJURY IN FACT
As of June 6, Judge Gasch was reluctant to find that
the President's action had caused the plaintiffs to suf-
fer injury in fact. One of the troubling aspects of
Goldwater v. Carter is that it is difficult to determine
with precision what changed the Judge's mind on the
standing issue between June 6 and October 17. The sugges-
tion made above that the Judge may have been motivated
70. Complaint, supra note 4, at 3. Plaintiff Senators Strom
Thurmond and Carl Curtis are further characterized in the Complaint
as seeking "to preserve the effectiveness of their past yotes" C(n
1955 advising and consenting to ratification of the Mutual Defense
Treaty).
71. See,e.g., Reuss v. Balles, 584 F. 2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Edwards v. Carter, 580 F. 2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 907 (1978); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F. 2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 553 F. 2d 176 (D.C. Cir.
1977). See also Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee, Civ. Ac-
tion No. 79-1703 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 1979).
72. 481 F. Supp. 949, 951 (D.D.C. 1979).
73. Id.; see also 553 F. 2d at 204, 205, n. 68.
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to rule in favor of plaintiffs on the standing issue
because of the clear contrast between Senator Goldwater's
behavior and that of his colleagues was not purely specu-
lative. The reason announced by the Judge is that he
thought it prudent to allow some time for alternative
political remedies to be developed:
Believing that the resolution of the
ultimate issue of treaty termination
authority in this case should in the
first instance be in the legislative
forum, the Court stated that its
judicial powers should be exercised
only after the legislative branch
had been given the opportunity of
acting.74
The vote of June 6 and the "relative congressional inac-
tion" thereafter were apparently enough to persuade the
Judge that the vote evidenced "some congressional deter-
mination to participate in the process whereby a mutual
defense treaty is terminated and clearly [fell] short of
approving the President's termination effort."7(5
2. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT VIEW ON STANDING
As the litigation progressed, the President's attor-
neys argued with increasing vigor, or at least at in-
creasing length, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
assert a constitutionally based role in treaty termina-
tion. The memorandum of points and authorities in sup-
port of the defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment, filed by the Justice
Department on February 26, 1979, devoted three pages to
the standing question and twenty-three pages to the
merits of the question goncerning constitutional power
in treaty termination.7O The defendants' reply brief in
opposition to the plaintiffs' cross motion for summary
judgment, filed May 4, 1979, did not mention standing at
all. On June 12, 1979, the plaintiffs moved to alter or
74. 481 F. Supp. 949, 953-54 (D.D.C. 1979).
75. Id.
76. Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Goldwater
v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 CD.D.C. 1979); compare id. at 19-22
Cstanding) wih id. at 22-45 (question on the -merits).
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amend Judge Gasch's order of June 6, 1979, arguing that
standing had been conferred on the plaintiffs by the
Senate's vote on the Byrd resolution. This motion was
supported by a memorandum of points and authorities in
which it was noted that, before the vote of June 6,
Senator Goldwater had placed on each Senator's desk a
brief memorandum describing the Judge's order and the
pertinence of the vote on the Byrd resolution to the
standing question.7 7 On June 29, the Justice Department
filed a memorandum of points and authorities in opposi-
tion to the plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend Judge
Gasch's preliminary order. The Justice Department
devoted five of the thirteen pages in this memorandum
to the standing issue, asserting that the plaintiffs had
suffered no injury in fact because go final action had
been taken on the Byrd resolution.7o The Justice Depart-
ment devoted thirteen pages to the standing question in
its brief7 9 to the court of appeals and managed to per-
suade both Chief Judge Wright and Judge Tamm of the cor-
rectness of its position.8U The Solicitor General de-
voted two and a half pages to the standing question in
his brief in opposition to the grant of a writ of certi-
orari, but none of the Justices of the Supreme Court was
persuaded by his argument.Ol
The heart of the Justice Department's argument on
standing was that the plaintiffs had not made a showing
that the acts of the President injured them. Before the
appellate court, the Justice Department argued that
"[ilf ordinary citizens must seek political remedies for
perceived injuries to the separation of power doctrine,
both lw and logic compel elected officials to do the
same."'b2 The authorities cited for this proposition are
Reuss v. BalZes 83 and Harrington v. Bush. In these
two cases Congressmen Henry Reuss and Michael Harrington
were denied standing to sue as legislators because the
court did not find in their allegations an impairment of
77. Plaintiffs' Reply Brief at 4-5, Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F.
Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979).
78. See Defendants' Opposition, supra note 24, at 2-6.
79. Brief for Appellants, supra note 54, at 29-41.
80. See note 34 supra
81. See Brief for Respondents supra note 38.
82. Brief for Appellants, supra note 54, at 31.
83. 584 F. 2d at 466.
84. 553 F. 2d at 204.
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the efficacy of thp legislator's vote as it had in
Kennedy v. Sampsonb5 . The Justice Department has urged
the narrowest possible reading of the Kennedy precedent:
that standing should be conferred only on a legislator
who can show majority support for his or her positions
from a vote already cast and allegedly nullified by un-
lawful executive action or inaction,86 or who has been
authorized to litigate a matter on behalf of the Con-
gress. 7
In support of the Justice Department, it must be
acknowledged that the principle of separation of powers
underlies the District of Columbia Circuit's parsimony
in conferring standing on legislators who cannot show
that they enjoy the support of a majority of their col-
leagues in the legislative branch. Doing so ensures that
the judicial branch will not be used to circumvent or
short-circuit the very process of decisionmaking which
the Constitution entrusts to Congress in Article I. The
Kennedy court intimated as much:
In light of the purpose of the standing
requirement ... we think the better reasoned
view of both Coleman [v. Miller 307 U.S.
433 (1939)] and of the present case is
that an individual legislator has standing
to protect the effectiveness of his vote
with or without the conc rence of other
members of the majority.ff
85. 511 F. 2d at 432. The Kennedy court noted that Senator
Kennedy had alleged that President Nixon's pocket veto of the Fam-
ily Practice of Medicine Act had injured the senator by nullifying
his past vote in favor of the bill and by precluding him from sub-
sequently voting to override the veto.
86. Brief for Appellants, supra note 54, at 34-38. The brief
also suggests that it is proper to confer standing on a committee
or a Member of Congress where there is a showing of majority
approval of litigation brought to override the veto.
87. See United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph,
551 F. 2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F. 2d 725, 727 (D.C.
Cir. 1974). See also Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 6 701 (1978).
88. 511 F. 2d at 435 (emphasis supplied). This portion of the
court's opinion is inaccurately cited at page 23 of the Brief for
Appellees, Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.C. Cir., 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellees]. A typographical error
("the" in place of "other") yields a different sense than that
intended by the Court.
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In my opinion, the Justice Department's attempt to limit
legislator standing to narrow confines was misguided.
First, the Justice Department misread the holding in
Kennedy to mean that Senator Kennedy had no standing
with respect to his right to vote to override President
Nixon's "pocket veto," and that Senator Goldwater, by
analogy, had no standing with respect to a vote not yet
cast at the time the lawsuit was going forward. The
Kennedy court did not hold that no legislator could ever
have standing conferred because of a denial of his op-
portunity to vote in the future. It did not have to
reach that question because it ruled in favor of the
Senator's claim that his prior vote had been unlawfully
nullified.
The misreading of Kennedy by President Carter's law-
yers may be illustrated by a hypothetical example which
changes only one detail in our recent past. It is well
known that after the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolu-
tion, the Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, and
the current chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, F2ank Church, led an effort to bring about
an end to American military operations in Southeast Asia
through the mechanism of a funding cutoff. If, however,
the leadership of the Congress had, through parliamen-
tary maneuvers of one sort or another, effectively frus-
trated for over two years any possibility of a vote on
the appropriations used by the executive branch of
government as ongoing legal authority for those military
operations, the courts would have been compelled to
recognize the standing of a member of Congress alleging
that he had suffered injury in fact from this depriva-
tion of an opportunity to vote, 89 if only because the
text of the Constitution explicitly mandates continuous
congressional oversight of military operations by limit-
ing military appropriations to a maximum of two years. 9 0
To be sure, the federal courts were uniformly unwilling
to allow a judicial test of the conflict between the
congressional war-making power and the presidential
commander-in-chief power which was alleged during the
89. See e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F. 2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
90. U.S. Const. art. I. § 8, cl. 12.
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Vietnam era, 9 1 but it is surely wrong to suggest that
the federal courts may not grant standing with respect
to threatened injuries9 2 as well as to past injuries.
In the Goldwater case, this fundamental element of
the standing doctrine becomes significant because it is
eminently reasonable to infer from the behavior of both
the Senate leadership and the executive branch that
dilatorytactics were relied upon not only to frustrate
attempts of the Senate to finalize its vote of June 6,
but also to keep the legal issue raised by Senator Gold-
water and others from being decided by the federal
courts. It was apparently hoped that this suit would be
rendered moot after January 1, 1980.
Second, the Justice Department suggested that Sena-
tor Goldwater and his colleagues lacked standing because
their suit was not authorized by a majority of the Con-
gress or by the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel.9 3
This suggestion has the clear advantage of overcoming
the anti-majoritarian difficulties alluded to above as
well as the representational difficulties which can
arise when an individual claims to speak on behalf of an
institution. The application of this argument to Gold-
water v. Carter, however, is flawed for two reasons. It
seems clear as a matter of legislative history that Con-
gress did not intend the Office of the Senate Counsel to
deny standing to individual members of Congress alleging
91. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970)
(attempt by Commonwealth to bring an original action to prevent its
citizens from being sent to Viet Nam); Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F.
Supp. 848 (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd sub nom., Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.
2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970)(suit
by private citizen; no standing and political question); Luftig v.
McNamara, 252 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd, 373 F. 2d 664 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 945 (1968); Mora v. McNamara,
387 F. 2d. 862 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1968)
(suits by servicemen being sent to Viet Nam; political question);
Ashton v. United States, 404 F. 2d 95 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 972 (1967) (defense on refusing to submit to induction).
For a brief discussion of the refusal of the Supreme Court to re-
view these cases, see L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitu-
tion 214-15 (1972) [hereinafter cited as L. Henkin]; Brief for
Appellees, supra note 88 at 37,
92. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
93. The Senate Legal Counsel is a new institution created in
the wake of the confrontation between Congress and the President
that was established to deal with abuses of executive power. 2
U.S.C. § 288 (Supp. 1979).
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personal injury in their roles as legislators.94 More-
over, the Justice Department's suggestion that Senator
Goldwater and his colleagues are "suing the Executive in
an effort to obtain a political victor in the Courts
which had eluded him in the Congress"9  too conveniently
overlooks the fact that on June 6, the Senate voted by a
margin of 59 to 35 to replace the committee text of the
resolution on treaty termination, which was supported by
the Carter administration, with the resolution offered
by Senator Byrd concerning termination of mutual defense
treaties.96 Whatever one is to make of that act, and of
the subsequent refusal of the Senate leadership to allow
a final vote on the matter, it is ridiculous to charac-
terize Senator Goldwater either as one who was attempting
to subvert the normal processes of legislative decision-
making or as one who believes in extravagant judicial
activism.
In any event, as Judge Gasch noted in his opinion of
October 17, 1979, "the potential availability of a remedy
through the legislative process...is not conclusive on
the question of injury in fact and thus certainly not
fatal to a legislatort s standing claim."9 7 Judge Gasch
distinguished all of the cases in which legislator stand-
ing had been denied98 by noting that in those cases:
there was no impediment to the legis-
lative process whatsoever and the powers
of the plaintiff Congressmen remained
rather clearly undiminished [and that]
there was a genuine risk of interfering
with or circumventing the legislative
process, and thus provid[ing] judicial
redress for Congressmen who had simply
failed to take advantage of, or to suc-
ceed in persuading their colleagues to
take advantage of, an expedient oppor-
tunity for legislative action. 9 9
94. See Appendix at 583-85 Goldwater y. Carter, (D.C. Cir. Nov.
30, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Appendix].
95. Brief for Appellants, supra note 54, at 37.
96. 125 Cong. Rec. S7038-39 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
a7. 481 F. Supp. 949, 952, citing Metcalf v. Nq4t-iona Petroleum
Council, 553 F. 2d at 189 n. 129, Reuss w. falZes, 584 F. 2d at 468,
Kennedy v. Sc pson, 511 F. 2d at 435, n. 17.
98. See cases cited at note 71 supra.
99. 481 F. Supp. 949, 953.
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In Judge Gasch's mind, those cases are distinguishable
because the plaintiffs in Goldwater had made bona fide
efforts to take advantage of every available opportunity
for legislative action.100
Moreover, the leading cases on standing support the
view that Senator Goldwater and his co-plaintiffs had
suffered injury in fact. In IFarta v. SeZdin,1 0 1 Justice
Powell wrote that the core notion of the injury require-
ment is that the plaintiff must allege such a "personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant
his invocation of federal court jurisdiction and to jus-
tify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his
behalf."1 0 2 The "personal stake in the outcome" test is
derived from Baker v, Carr10 3 where Justice Brennan
wrote that the purpose of this test is "to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illu-
mination of difficult constitutional questions."104 It
seems clear that the plaintiffs in Goldwater easily
passed this "personal stake in the outcome" test. Be-
cause Judge Gasch was reversed on the merits, the plain-
tiffs were in fact denied participation in the process
of terminating a treaty about which the Senate, by a
unanimous vote (94-0) taken less than three months prior
to President Carter's announcement of December 15 1978,
had indicated its strong desire to be consulted.105 Had
100. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
101. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
102. Id. at 498-99.
103. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
104. Id. at 204.
105. Section 26 (b) of the International Security Assistance
Act of 1978 reads as follows: "It is the sense of Congress that
there should be prior consultation between the Congress and the
executive branch on any proposed policy changes affecting the con-
tinuation in force of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954." 22 U.S.C.
§ 2151 note. The plaintiffs in Goldater sought declaratory relief
that the defendants violated this provision by failing to consult
with the Congress on the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty.
Complaint, supra note 4, at 14. Judge Gasch denied this relief in
his order of June 6, 1979, noting that Pub. L. No. 95-384 (1978),
also known as the Dole-Stone Amendment, is a non-binding sense of
the Congress Resolution. To be sure, several Senators, including
the authors of the Dole-Stone Amendment roundly criticized Presi-
dent Carter for failure to consult with them prior to his
announcement. See, e.g., Cong. Rec. S101 (daily ed. Jan. 15,
(1979)(remarks of Sen. DeConcini); id. at S309 (remarks
of Sen. Roth). But Judge Gasch correctly noted that even
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Judge Gasch been affirmed on the merits, the plaintiffs'
role in the policy decision of whether to terminate a
mutual defense with a friendly nation would have been
performed. In either result, the plaintiffs clearly had
a "personal stake in the outcome."
From the sheer volume (or, to be more precise, the
four volumes of the appendix filed with the appellate
court) and from the sharpness of the debate between the
attorneys for the parties in the GoZdwater case, it is
obvious that Justice Brennan's concern in Baker v. Carr
was met. The Warth rationale was likewise fulfilled in
Goldwater, for it seems plain that the plaintiffs demon-
strated sufficient personal interest in the outcome of
the case to warrant invoking federal court jurisdiction.
C. CAUSATION AND JUDICIAL REDRESSABILITY
Since at least 1970, Justices Brennan and White have
been of the opinion that the only standing requirement
imposed by the Conistitution is that the plaintiff allege
injury in fact. 1 0 But this view has never enjoyed the
support of a majority of the Court. To the contrary,
after announcing a relatively simple two-prong test in
1970,107 the Court has added two more requirements:
causation and judicial redressability. The causation
requirement is exemplified in Warth v. Seldin,108 where
the Court denied standing to low-income persons seeking
the invalidation of a restrictive zoning ordinance be-
cause they had failed to demonstrate that their inabi-
lity to obtain adequate housing within their means was
105. (Continued)
if the Dole-Stone Amendment had obligated the President to consult
with the Congress, it did not specify the sort of consultation or
the amount of consultation which would satisfy its intent. See
Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce v. Adams, Civ. No. 78-0517, (D.D.
C. Nov. 30, 1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-1123 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21,
19J8).
106. See Association of Data Processing Service Organizations
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 167 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
107. In Data Processing, the Court held that standing should
he conferred on plaintiffs if they have suffered injury in fact
and if the interests they assert are within the zone of interests
protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.
108. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). See also Tushnet, New Law of
Standing: A Plea for Abandonment 62 Cornell L. Rev. 663 (1977).
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fairly attributable to the challenged ordinance instead
of to other factors. The redressability requirement is
exemplified in Simon v. Eas-tern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization,109 in which the Court denied standing to
a group of welfare recipients who challenged a change
in the federal tax policy which extended a tax benefit
to certain hospitals. The Court found that the plain-
tiffs had failed to show that any judicial alteration
of the new IRS policy would result in better treatment
of indigents by these hospitals, or otherwise redress
their grievance.
The Justice Department construed these two require-
ments as denying standing to the plaintiffs in Goldwater.
First, the defendants' attorneys asserted that the
plaintiffs had failed to show that their grievance could
"fairly be traced"ll0 to a conflict between them and the
Executive. In support of this theory, the President's
lawyers argued to the Court of Appeals that "the Sen-
ate's actions, not the President 's, have prevented this
issue from coming to a vote."1 1l  The Justice Depart-
ment's view of congressional maneuvering and political
conflict rests on solid evidence.1 1 2 The argument that
is developed from that evidence, however, places too
much emphasis on Congress' responsibility. In focusing
exclusively on the actions and inactions of the Senate
on the Byrd and Goldwater resolutions, the argument
fails to account for the executive department's role in
these events. It overlooks the fact that many State
Department officials have repeatedly stated, sometimes
through a speech drafted in Foggy Bottom and uttered
on Capitol Hill by a leading Senator such as Edward
Kennedy,1 1 3 that the power to terminate treaties resides
exclusively in the Executive. More significantly, the
Justice Department view of causation in the chain of
events being litigated in Goldwater is little more than
109. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
110. Id. at 41.
111. Brief for Appellants, supra note 54, at 32 (emphasis sup-
plied). See also id. at 33, where the appellants argued: "The
Senate's treatment of these measures [including the Goldwater reso-
lution] strongly suggests that the frustration of plaintiffs'
desire to vote 'fairly can be traced' to political conflict within
the Senate itself rather than to political conflict between the
Executive and the Legislature." (emphasis supplied).
112. See Appendix, supra note 94, at 802-10; see also notes
25-28 supra.
113. See, e.g., Wash. Post, Aug. 16, 1977, at Al; The Boston
Globe, Aug. 16, 1979, at Al; Wash. Post, Aug. 17, 1977, at A17.
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a shell game whereby the principal agent of these
events, the President, mysteriously disappears when one
asks; "Whose actions provoked this lawsuit?". Judge
Gasch apparently saw through the ruse, as did fourteen
of the other sixteen judges who were involved in the
case.
The lack of judicial redressability was also asser-
ted by the Justice Department as a reason for denying
standing to the plaintiffs in Goldwater. Before the
Court of Appeals, the President's lawyers argued that
the plaintiffs were "not asking for an advisory opinion
by demonstrating that the court can redress [their]
injury. 11  This assertion was gratuitous, for the
plaintiffs had briefed the District Court on redress-
ability,1 1 5 and that Court ruled on October 17, 1979,
that "a judicial decision declaring the constitutional
requirements for terminating the Treaty can afford
plaintiffs the precise relief requested, and thus the
injury is one likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision. ,,116
In summary, plaintiffs made a persuasive argument
for resolving the standing question in Goldwater in
their favor. Only two of the seventeen judges who par-
ticipated in the case were persuaded by the claim made
by President Carter's attorneys that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to commence the action. One way to
interpret the fact that all of the Supreme Court Jus-
tices voted to grant certiorari and then failed to ad-
dress the standing question is that the plaintiffs suc-
ceeded in demonstrating that they had been injured in
fact, that there was a causal nexus between the alleged
injury and the acts of the defendants, and that the
injury complained of could be redressed by a court, In
short, Senator Goldwater and his colleagues were proper
to raise the question of the allocation of constitution-
al power to terminate treaties.
114. Brief for Appellants, supra note 54, at 30, citing Simon
v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 38.
115. Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposi-
tion to Defendants' Alternative Motions and Plaintiffs' Cross-
Motions for Summary Judgment at 24 Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp.
949 (D.D.C. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Points and Authorities in
Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition], citing Duke Power Co. v. Caro-
lina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978), in which
Chief Justice Burger wrote for a unanimous Court that the appropriate
standard for conferring standing is a substantial likelihood that
judicial relief will redress the claimed injuries.
116. 481 F. Supp. at 955 n. 23.
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II. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE: WHO SHOULD
DECIDE HOW TREATIES ARE TO BE TERMINATED?
The Goldwater case illustrates the truth of Profes-
sor Tribe's generalization that the "[p]olitical ques-
tion doctrine is in a state of some confusion."ll7 Ten-
sion, if not confusion, is to be found as early as
Marbury v. Madison.l18  In Marbury, Chief Justice Mar-
shall declared, on the one hand, that [i]t is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is .... If two laws conflict with
each other, the courts must decide on the operation of
each.ll 9 On the other hand, the same case serves as the
origin of the political question doctrine, for Marshall
also wrote in Marbury that "[b]y the Constitution of the
United States, the President is invested with certain
important political powers, in the exercise of which he
is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only
to his country in his political character, and to his
own conscience. "120
Confusion, but no tension, has arisen when the
political question doctrine has been used to exalt the
power of one branch (generally the Executive branch)
over another (generally the Congress). A classic exam-
ple of this is the famous, if exaggerated, phrase coined
by Justice Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp. 1 2 1 to the effect that presidential hegemony
over foreign affairs is complete: "the very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole
organ of the federal government in international rela-
tions -- a power which does not require as a basis for
its exercise an act of Congress."1 2 2 Given the mood of
the Court in 1936, it may seem strange that the "Nine
Old Men," who were ripping up domestic New Deal legis-
lation right and left as "delegation running riot," 1 2 3
found themselves virtually unanimous (only Justice
McReynolds dissented and without a word of explanation)
in bestowing on President Roosevelt plenary powers over
117. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
118. L. Tribe, supra note 54, at 71.
119. Id. at 177.
120. Id. at 165-66.
121. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
122. Id. at 320.
123. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935).
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foreign affairs. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has sugges-
ted that the extravagant Curtis-s-Fright opinion is
accounted for by attending to the background of Chief
Justice Hughes, a former Secretary of State, and Justice
Sutherland, a former member of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee. As a Senator Sutherland had advocated
exclusive presidential control over foreign affairs.12
4
In passing, one might note the background of two of
the Justices who explicitly stated their adherence to
the Sutherland view in Goldwater. Justice Rehnquist, who
cited Curtiss-Wright as his principal authority for the
claim that a legal controversy is a nonjusticiable poli-
tical question if it involves the authority of the Presi-
dent to conduct foreign affairs, 1 2 5 served in the Nixon
administration as the sub-cabinet officer in the Justice
Department chiefly responsible for developing constitu-
tional interpretation within the executive branch. Simi-
larly, Chief Justice Burger, who concurred in Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Goldwater, also served as an
Assistant Attorney General in a Republican administra-
tion, and was charged with the task of defending the
executive branch in civil litigation. That one may not
infer that such service automatically produces either un-
dying loyalty to the executive branch of government or
an uncritical attitude toward the claims put forward by
the Solicitor General is illustrated by the vote of
Justice White, who also served in a high-ranking Justice
Department position before joining the Court. But at
least one commentator has argued that a pattern of
ideological preference in favor of the power of the
Executive can be deduced from the opinions of Justice
Rehnquist. 126
Another important feature of the Sutherland view is
that it was uttered in a period when America was still
profoundly isolationist in character. Now that techno-
logy and multinational economic actors have reduced our
world to an interdependent market, it is difficult, if
124. See A. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency 101
(1973). Schlesinger repeats a story told by Judge Charles Wyzanski
that Professor Thomas Reed Powell used to tell his students at
Harvard Law School: "Just because Mr. Justice Sutherland writes
clearly, you must not suppose that he thinks clearly." Id. at 103.
125. 100 S. Ct. at 537-38 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
126. See Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View,
90 Harv. L. Rev. 293 (1976).
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not impossible, to sustain a dichotomy between foreign
and domestic policies. As the turbulent episode which
erupted at our embassy in Teheran in November 1979
demonstrates, the decision to admit a single person to
enter our country can have profound effects across the
world. Similarly, as anyone who has shopped in a bar-
gain basement knows, domestic consumers would have to
pay a lot more for clothing if we did not have friendly
relations with places like Taiwan, Singapore, Hong
Kong, and South Korea. In short, our domestic policies
have ramifications throughout the globe, and our for-
eign policies have profound consequences for our
domestic economy.
It is, of course, conceivable that the Congress
might be effectively excluded from the domain of for-
eign affairs. This could occur through increasing
reliance on executive agreements to an extent that
would dwarf the advise-and-consent function of the
Senate.127 Another possibility would be congressional
acquiescence in the extravagant claim that treaty termi-
nation is, to use Sutherland's phrase, the "plenary and
exclusive power of the President..., a power which does
not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Con-
gress. ... ,,128 If either method yields the result of
exclusive presidential power over foreign affairs,
that result will in turn need to be justified on a
different worldview than the dichotomous one of
Justice Sutherland.
If the rightful role of Congress in the formation
of our foreign policy, including the making and unmaking
of binding international commitments in treaties, is to
be safeguarded against presidential usurpation, Congress
will have to be more vigorous in reclaiming that role
for itself. For, as Justice Jackson wrote in Youngstown
Sheet and Tube Co, v. Sawyer (the Steel Seizure Case),
"only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping
through its fingers."1 2 9 As the Goldwater case illus-
trates, however, one of the legitimate means of reasser-
tion of congressional power in foreign relations is the
commencement of a lawsuit by a Member of Congress, the
goal of which would be to restore to the Congress more
vivid participation in the process of formulating the
127. For a brief statement of my views on this matter, see
Treaty Temination, supra note 13, at 491-94.
128. 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
129. 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1953)(Jackson, J. concurring).
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policy of treaty termination. And as the improper del 1
gation cases of the 1930's,130 the Steel Seizure Case o3
the impoundment cases,1 32 and United States v. Nixonl33
all illustrate, federal courts have been receptive to
suits challenging exaggerated claims of executive author-
ity. I hasten to add that nothing is sered by exagger-
ated claims of congressional authority.l35
Professor Reisman has provided a very helpful way of
differentiating various stages in the process of termina-
tion of a treaty: (1) the formulation of policies as to
whether an agreement should be terminated, (2) the con-
duct of negotiations to effect termination, (3) the re-
peal of the law of the land established by an agreement
and 0I) formally notifying the other party of the termina-
tion of an agreement.1 3 5  In Reisman's view, with which
I agree, it is proper for Congress to share with the
President the first and third stages, but the President
should retain exclusive control over the second and
fourth stages.
Judge Gasch was clearly aware of the need to distin-
guish among various stages in the treaty termination
process. In his opinion of October 17, 1979, he wrote:
130. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). It is worth
noting that one of the dubious gifts to society which resulted from
the death of the Blue Eagle of the NRA was the birth of the Federal
Register. 44 U.S.C. § 301. As a result of the daily publication
of all executive orders and federal administrative regulations,
there has not been a significant case holding that Congress had
improperly delegated legislative functions to an executive agency
that had not bothered to inform people of its myriad rules.
131. See text accompanying notes 223-30
132. See, e.g., Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975);
text accompanying notes 253-55 infra.
133. 418 U.S. 683 (1974); see text accompanying notes 242-247
infra.
134. For a brief statement of my views on congressional over-
reaching, see Treaty Termination, supra note 13, at 494-96.
135. Id. at 390-91.
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[Tihe President's status as the
nation's spokesman and representa-
tive in foreign affairs [cannot]
serve as the basis for exclusive
executive power over the entire
proqess of treaty termination.
While the President may be the sole
organ of communication with foreign
governments, he is clearly not the
sole maker of foreign policy.i3o
It is likewise clear that Judge Gasch understood the
still more limited function appropriate to a federal
court in passing on the dispute in Goldwater, i.e., "not
to attempt to evaluate the wisdom of the underlying poli-
tical decision or to substitute its judgment for that of
a political department, but simply to determine whether
the treaty termination was effectuated by constitutional-
ly permissible means."?1 3 7
In short, I do not think that Goldwater should have
been viewed as a nonjusticiable political question, in
part because I do not accept the simplistic bifurcation
of our national policy into hermetically sealed areas,
with domestic affairs susceptible of congressional par-
ticipation, and foreign affairs the exclusive domain 9f
the Executive. The view expressed in Baker v. Carrl 3O
concerning the role of the judiciary in refereeing for-
eign policy conflicts between the political branches of
government is far more realistic: "it is error to sup-
pose that every case or controversy which touches for-
eign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.
'" 1 3 9
This view was expressly adopted by Justices Brennan and
Powell in Goldwater, was implicitly shared by the
majority in the appellate court, and was expressly
adopted by Judge Gasch in the District Court.
Identifying a political question according to the
six standards articulated by Justice Brennan in Baker v.
136. 481 F. Supp, at 961 Cemphasia supplied).
137. Id.
138. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
139. Id. at 211. In Pillai v, CAB, 485 F. 2d 18 (D.C. Cir.
1973), Judge Wilkey echoed this theme when he wrote: "The time has
long passed when the words 'foreign policy,' uttered in hushed
tones, can evoke a reverential silence from either a court or the
man on the street." Id. at 1031, n. 34.
116 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER IVOL.6
Carr l O indicates that the issues in Goldwater were
judicially cognizable. The first criterion states the
standard rule that a court should refrain from interpos-
ing its judgment where there is "a textually demonstrable
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political depart-
ment."141 After the ingenious constructftu of the con-
stitutional text in Powell v. McCormack, in which the
Court decided that the question of membership in the
House of Representatives was a justiciable rather than a
political question, one might wonder what is left of
this first criterion. Indeed, the leading article on
the political question doctrine, written by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee's consultant on treaty ter-
mination, Professor Louis Henkin, suggests that the "teN-
tual commitment" test has little validity or vitality.
1 43
In any event, the test seems wholly inapplicable to
the Goldwater litigation. The one point on which all
the parties seemed to agree was that the text of the.
Constitution is clear about the making of treaties
1 4 4
but not about their unmaking. To construct an argument
140. The six criteria articulated in Baker are:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department;
[2] or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it;
[3] or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion,
[4] or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordi-
nate branches of government;
[5] or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already
made;
[6] or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
369 U.S. at 217.
141. Id.
142. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
143. Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85
Yale L.J. 604-05 (1976).
144. "He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-
thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S. Const. art. II, § 2,
cl.2.
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in favor of treaty termination as a shared power, one is
forced to rely on impl cations of the Take Care clause, 145
the supremacy clausel6 and on the general model of
separation of powers found in the structure rather than
the text of the Constitution. To construct an argument
in favor of exclusive presidential power in treaty termi-
nation, one is constrained to derive from the Article II
authorization of the President to nominate ambassadors147
much more than the "plain meaning" of the text of the
Constitution: that the treaty termination power is com-
mitted to a coordinate branch of the government.
Scholars have labelW@d Brennan's second and third
criteria "functional.''1 These criteria would charac-
terize as political questions those for which there was
no judicially discoverable standard of resolution and
those which could not be decided without making prelimi-
nary policy determinations deemed beyond the bounds of
judicial discretion. The criteria identify those ques-
tions that, in some aspect, exceed the limits of the
judicial function.
The question which the federal courts were asked to
resolve in Goldwater required judicially discoverable
standards which did not demand that the courts pass on
the wisdom of whether to terminate the Mutual Defense
Treaty of 1954. Chief Justice Marshall relied on the
distinction between policy judgments and constitutional
interpretation to defend his handling of McCulloch
v. Maryland: "The peculiar circumstances of the moment
may render a measure more or less wise, but cannot ren-
der it more or less constitutional."l49
145. "He [the President] shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed." U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
146. "[All Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land." U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
147. "He [the President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors [and]
other public Ministers and Consuls," U.S. Const. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2
148. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Consti-
tutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7-9 (1959)(classical interpreta-
tion); A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, 189-96 (1962) (pru-
dential interpretation);Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political
Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L.J. 517, 596-97 (I66)
(functional interpretation).
149. Marshall's defense of McCulloch v. Maryland 190-91 (G.
Gunther, ed. 1969).
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Now that biographies of Marshall have moved beyond
federalist filiopietism, we are in a better position to
assess whether the Chief Justice drew such a bright line
between policy preferences and constitutional adjudica-
tion throughout his career.1 5 0 And, although few
judges are candid enough to admit it, 1 51 it seems plain
that many of them read their own policy preferences into
constitutional "doctrine." Indeed, some scholars have
made telling arguments why, in some circumstances, this
should be the case. 1 5 2
In light of the popularity of the recent volume by
two journalist M urporting to reveal the "inside" of the
Supreme Court, we may experience a revival, preferably
short-lived, of legal realism in its more vulgar form of
"judicial hunch" as explanatory of the outcome of cases.
If the judges involved in Goldwater engaged in exercises
of "raw judicial power, "154 it was not because the case
involved a policy-making decision inappropriate to the
judiciary. At the least, it may fairly be claimed that
the plaintiffs never called upon the judges to decide
the case on the basis of the judges' personal political
inclinations for or against the new China policy. To be
sure, our China policy is controversial, but the judges
were never invited into that controversy. They were not
asked to pass judgment on the wisdom of selling Coca-
Cola and computers in Peking or to opine about the ade-
quacy of the protection of human rights in Taipei. They
were, rather, asked to fashion a judicial remedy to re-
solve an apparent conflict among the branches as to who
is authorized under domestic constitutional law to
150. See, e.g., L. Baker, John Marshall: A Life in Law (1974).
151. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes was the exception
who proved the rule. While Republican Governor of New York in 1907
he stated: "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is
what the judges say it is." M. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes 204
(1951). Cf. B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 88-94
()1921).
152. See, e.g., Hazard, The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64
Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1978); D. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy
(1977); Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 Yale
L.J. 227 (1972); Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme
Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20
Stan. L. Rev. 169 C1968). Contra, P. Kurland, Politics, The
Constitution, and the Warren Court (1970); Bickel, The Least Danger-
ous Branch (1962).
153. See B. Woodward & S. Armstrong, The Brethren (1979).




terminate treaties. The remedy proposed by Judge
Gasch did not involve him in answering the ultimate
question in Goldwater, to terminate or not to terminate
the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC; it merely stated
that both political branches must be engaged in the reso-
lution of that question. In short, the functional cri-
teria announced in Baker v. Carr were met in Goldwater:
the judges could have decided the question before them
without making an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly calling for nonjudicial discretion.-55
The last three criteria identified by Justice Brennan
in Baker v. Carr involve prudential considerations. A
case is to be considered as implicating a nonjusticiable
"political question" if the court cannot undertake a
resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordi-
nate branches of government; if there is an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision al-
ready made; or if there is a potentiality of embarrass-
ment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart-
ments on one question.
Careful analysis of these prudential criteria sug-
gests that they need not have deterred a federal court
from reaching the merits in Goldwater, The Justice
Department briefs repeatedly sounded ominous warnings
about the imminent collapse of American foreign policy
with respect to the PRC if the defendahts did not prevail
in this case,15 6 This hyperbolic style appears to sur-
face in the Justice Department when the executive branch
finds itself in court in the midst of a significant cri-
sis, such as the Steel Seizure Case 1 57 or United States
V. The Progressive.15 8 In the former instance President
Truman was able to continue prosecution of the Korean
war without unauthorized federal supervision and opera-
tion of steel mills idled by a labor-management dispute.
In the latter instance, no one will learn any significant
"secret" about the construction of nuclear weaponry and
still less will anyone be enabled to make such weapons
155. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 211-12, 217; se also
United States v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 567 F. 2d 121, 126 (D.C.
Cir. 1977)(differentiating between "political controversy" and
"political question").
156. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants, supra note 54, at 18-28.
157. See 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (arguments made by Solicitor
General Philip Perlman); see also note 247 infra.
158. 467 F. Supp. 990 (D. Wisc. 1979).
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as a result of the publication of the story in The Pro-
gressive. As to Goldwater, it is worth noting that the
Great Wall of China withstood Judge Gasch's opinion of
October 17, and that, if I read the ads in The New Yorker
correctly, Americans were still able to obtain a visa to
visit the Forbidden City or to conduct more profitable
commercial ventures. 159
One more point needs to be made about the prudential
criteria concerning the political question issue. The
Justice Department briefs relied on Justice Sutherland's
dictum in Curtiss-Wright and on a string of cases involv-
ing various aspects of foreign affairs to support the
remarkable conclusion that courts have no business in-
quiring as to the possibility of ultra vires executive
action. But the authorities relied on by the President's
attorneys do not support the generalized proposition for
which they were cited. In Curtiss-Wright, for example,
a joint resolution of Congress had explicitly authorized
the very sort of executive decision challenged by the
defendant as an improper delegation of le g1slative au-
thority. And in United States v. Belmont I 0 and United
States v. Pink,16 1 the Court merely ruled that the
supremacy clause required that an otherwise valid inter-
national agreement would take priority over a conflict-
ing state law.
In sum, as Professor Henkin has written:
Despite common impressions and numerous
citations, there are in fact few cases,
and apparently no foreign affairs case,
in which the Supreme Court ordained or
approved. . . judicial abstention from
constitutional review or from deciding
some other question that might have led
to a different result in the case. In
the foreign affairs cases commonly cited
the courts did not refrain from judging
political actions by constitutional
standards; they judged them but found them
constitutionally not wanting ....
159. See, e.g., Chinese Seem Unruffled by U.S. Court Decision
on Accord with Taiwan, Wash. Post, Oct, 20, 1979, at A14, col., 5.
160. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
161. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
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There is, then, no Supreme Court
precedent for extraordinary abstention
from judicial review in foreign affairs
cases.162
The most recent expression of Professor Henkin's thought
on treaty termination is that this power is exclusively
presidential. He thinks that the argument for congres-
sional or senatorial participation in this power has only
"specious plausibility.163 Nonetheless, even after the
Vietnam-era political question casesl6 q Professor Henkin
was apparently of the view that the Goldwater case should
not have been dismissed as a nonjusticiable "political
question."
1lb5
III. THE HISTORICAL QUESTION; WHAT CAN WE LEARN
FROM THE PAST?
The intent of the framers and the historical experi-
ence in treaty termination is the chief gocus of the
leading articles on treaty termination.loo Historical
162. L. Henkin, supra note 911 at 213-15.
163. Id.
164. See cases cited in note 91 supra; see also Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
936 (1974); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F. 2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
165. See Henkin, Litigating the Pr esident's Power to Terminate
Treaties, supra note 14, at 647. Hut see Henkin, Is There a
Political Question Doctrine?, supra note 48. Cf. Scharpf, supra
note 48, at 542. ("The constitutional scope of the treaty power
vis-a-vis the states and vis-a-vis individual rights, and the
allocation of competence in this field among the executive and
legislative departments, were never held to present nonjusticiable
questions.")(emphasis supplied).
166. Scheffer, supra note 1, at 977-1005; Emerson, The Legis-
lative Role in Treaty Termination, 5 J. Legis. 46, 48-69 (1978);
Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and
Abrogation of Treaties: The Original Intent of the Framers of the
Constitution Historically Examined, 55 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1979);
Thomas, The Abuse of History: A Refutation of the State Department
Analysis of Alleged Instances of Independent Presidential Treaty
Termination, 6 Yale Stud. World Pub. Ord. 1, 25-78 (1979).
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arguments likewise occupied considerable portions of
the triall6 7 and appellate briefs.1 6 8 In the opinion of
October 17, 1979, Judge Gasch made use of the historical
materials presented to him in Goldwater. First, the
judge noted that treaties have been terminated in a
variety of ways, including the following: by statute
directing the President to deliver notice of termina-
tion;1  by the President acting pursuant to a joint
resolution of Congress or otherwise acting with the con-
currence of both houses of Congress; 1 7 0 by the President
acting with senatorial consent;1 7 1 and by the President
acting alone.1 7
2
As Professor Henkin noted in a recent editorial, the
State Department and Senator Goldwater counted and
weighed the precedents differently. 1 7 3 After reviewing
the historical materials, Judge Gasch concluded that the
precedents cited for unilateral executive action were of
"only marginal utility.'174 Without attempting to
resolve the quarrel between the parties concerning the
number of treaties terminated in the past and the means
whereby each had been terminated, Judge Gasch stated
that the historical evidence in favor of exclusive presi-
167. See, e.g., Points and Authorities, in Support of Plain-
tiffs' Opposition, supra note 115, at 28-35; Points and Authorities
in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,
for Summary Judgment at 33-38, Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp.
949 (D.D.C. 1979).
168. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 54, at 53-57; see
also Brief for Appellees, supra note 88, at 48-51; Reply Brief for
Appellees at 23-27 Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246, 48 U.S.L.W.
2380 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
169. For the evidence of this mode of treaty termination, see
Scheffer, supra note 1, at 1002-05; Emerson, supra note 166, at 52-
53, 59-60.
170. See Emerson, supra note 166, at 53-59.
171. Id. at 69-77.
172. See, e.g., Kennedy, Normal Relations with China: Good
Law, Good Policy 65 A.B.A. J. 194, 195-96 (1979), reprinted in 125
Cong. Rec. S7017 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
173. Compare Memorandum from the Legal Adviser, Herbert Han-
sell, to the Secretary of State, Dated Dec. 15, 1978 [hereinafter
cited as Hansell Memorandum] in Treaty Termination, supra note 13,
at 147-91, with the memorandum on the history of treaty termination
prepared for Senator Goldwater by his staff counsel, J. Terry
Emerson, reprinted in 125 Cong. Rec. S1891-95 (daily ed. March 1,
1979); see also id. at S2158-59 (daily ed. March 7, 1979), S2300
(daily ed. March 8, 1979), and S7042 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
174. 481 F. Supp. at 959.
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dential authority was not persuasive because:
[NIone of these examples involves a
mutual defense treaty, nor any treaty
whose national and international
significance approaches that of the
1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. Virtually
all of them, moreover, can be readily
distinguished on the basis of some
triggering factor not present here. 1 75
The Judge explained in a footnote how those cases of
apparent unilateral presidential action might be dis-
tinguished:
Unilateral executive action in
terminating a treaty would presumably
be permissible, as both parties
recognize, when the treaty is super-
seded by an inconsistent law or treaty;
when the treaty becomes impossible to
perform or is otherwise rendered
inoperative; when the treaty is violated
or denounced by the other party; or when
there has been a fundamental change in
circumstances affecting treaty ....
Many of the instances cited by
defendants in which the President has
acted alone involve one or more of the
above factors. In others, if the treaty
was not actually superseded by incon-
sistent legislation, there was at the
very least a substantial participation
by Congress in establishing the policy
that led to the termination, the result
of which amounted to an implied authori-
zation.176
Perhaps because of the extraordinary speed with which
Goldwater was decided, neither the appellate court nor
the Supreme Court expressed any serious interest in the
historical evidence presented by both sides in the liti-
gation. Indeed, of the sixteen judges who reviewed
Judge Gasch's opinion, only one, Judge MacKinnon, made
175. Id.
176. Id. at 959, n. 46 (citations omitted).
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any significant use of these historical arguments.1 77
Judges have often been faulted by scholars for their
naive acceptance of sloppy "law office history" hastily
created by lawyers not trained in historical method and
inserted into briefs, not that all relevant factors might
be weighed, but so that the judges will be more likely to
decide a case in favor of the lawyers' clients.17 8 To be
sure, some of the scholars who have roundly excoriated
the Court for using "evidence wrenched from its contem-
porary historical context" or for "carefully select[ing]
those materials designed to prove the thesis at hand,
suppressing all data that might impeach the desired
historical conclusions," 1 79 have themselves been known
on occasion to have written one-sided, biased histgry
for insertion into briefs submitted to the Court.1 0 The
scholars then, might at least modify the tone of their
criticism of judges, for on the record of their perfor-
mances, neither group can afford to be too smug.
One eminent legal historian, Professor William Nelson,
who served as law clerk to Justice White, is of the
opinion that since historical data are ambiguous or poly-
valent and since few judges are good historians, history
should seldom be used to justify the results reached.18T
177. See Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246, 48 U.S.L.W. 2580
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979), quoted in Appendix to Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 54A-91A, Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S.Ct. 533 (1979).
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part.)
178. See, e.g., Gaffney, History and Legal Interpretations:
The Early Distortion of the Fourteenth Amendment By the Gilded Age
Court, 25 Cath. U. L. Rev. 207 (1976); C. Miller, The Supreme Court
and the Uses of History (1969); Levy, The Right Against Self-
Incrimination" History and Judicial History, 85 Pol. Sci. Q. 1
(1969); Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse,
1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. 89; Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of
History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. Chi L. Rev. 502
(1964); Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American
Constitutional History, 69 Am. Hist. Rev. 64 (1963); Bickel, The
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev.
1 (1955).
179. Kelly, Clio and the Court; An Illicit Love Affair, 1965
Sup. Ct. Rev. 119, 126.
180. Professor Alfred Kelly was the scholar principally
responsible for the N.A.A.C.P.'s brief in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954). The Court's reliance on that brief was criticized
by Bickel, supra note 178.
181. Nelson's views on "The Use of History by Judges" are con-
tained in an unpublished paper of that title.
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But there are cases in which legal judgment should be
informed by the past. There are cases in which courts
explicitly require counsel to brief them on the histori-
cal evidence concerning the intent of the framers and
the ratifying legislatures or conventions with respect
to various constitutional provisions.1
8 2
Although neither the District Court nor the Court of
Appeals formally requested counsel in Goldwater to brief
them on the historical evidence concerning treaty termi-
nation, this evidence was crucial to a proper determina-
tion of the case. Judge Gasch's training as a trial
attorney and federal judge served him well in the analy-
sis of the historical evidence submitted to him. He
carefully sorted out the conflicting claims presented in
Goldwater and saw through the defendants' inflated and
erroneous claim that there are fourteen instances in our
nation's history in which a President has given notice
of treaty termination independently of the Senate or of
the Congress.lO3 If the appellate judges and the
Justices of the Supreme Court had taken the opportunity
carefully to scrutinize the historical evidence, they
would have discovered that virtually all cases of treaty
termination have involved some form of legislative con-
sent, whether at the initiative of Congress (thirty nine
instances), in response to a presidential request for
treaty termination authority (four instances), through
implied authorization in statutes and treaties (two in-
stances), and through enactment of later inconsistent
law or approval of new treaties (seven instances).184
182. See, e.g., Broxm v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
Professor Bickel, then serving as law clerk to Justice Felix
Frankfurter, drafted the historical questions addressed to counsel
in the school segregation cases. See R. Kluger, Simple Justice
614-16 (1976).
183. This inflated count of the precedents is found in the
Hansell Memorandum, supra note 173, and in Kennedy, supra note 172.
It is repeated in the Brief for Appellants, supra note 54, at 54-
57.
184. This evidence is presented in Schaffer, supra note 1 and
Emerson, supra note 165 and is summarized in the Brief for Appel-
lees, supra note 88, at 57-64.
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Assuming, however, the wisdom of Professor Nelson's
caution against asking judges to perform the task of
historical criticism, the plaintiffs-appellees in Gold-
water might even have conceded the defendants' contention
that there are thirteen instances of unilateral presiden-
tial action to terminate a treaty. What follows? How-
ever one counts and weighs these acts (plaintiffs said
there were three, all distinguishable from the case at
bar; defendants said there were thirteen, all on point),
they do not add up to legal or constitutional althority
for exclusive presidential power in this area. 165 In
short, as Judge Tamm wrote in Kennedy v. Sampson: consis-
tent prgctice cannot create or destroy an executivepower,1 6~
One final point should be made in a consideration of
the use of history in the Goldwater case -- the history
surrounding the negotiation and ratification of the en-
tire complex of mutual defense treaties which entered in-
to force after World War 11187 and surrounding the parti-
cular mutual defense treaty with the ROC at issue in Gold-
water,188 The American ambassador to the ROC in 1954,
Karl L. Rankin, who played a major role in negotiating
and concluding this treaty, has stated: "To the best of
my knowledge, it never dawned on the negotiators that
the treaty would be terminated by the President acting
alone.18 9 To be sure, the negotiators in 1954 could not
185, However characterized, these acts do not grant the presi-
dent unreviewable discretion any more than the eight alleged
"seizures" of industrial plants and facilities by Presidents with-
out statutory or constitutional authority kept the Supreme Court
from ruling against President Truman's Secretary of Commerce in
the Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 648-49 (Jackson J.,, concurring);
than the executive practice of impounding funds appropriated by Con-
gress deterred the Supreme Court from declaring such practice ille-
gal in Train -v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35; or than the presi-
dential custom of refusing to comply with subpoenas was regarded as
authority for President Nixon's claim of immunity from a subpoena
to produce recordings needed for a criminal trial in -jnited States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 35.
186. 511 F. 2d 430, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
187. See Treaty Termination, supra note 13, at 290-97 (testi-
mony of Professor Alan Swan).
188. Id. at 389-95 (testimony of Professor Michael Reisman).
189. 125 Cong. Rec. S15797 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1979).
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have foreseen that Richard Nixon, then the Vice-Presi-
dent and well known for his strong opposition to Commu-
nism, would have initiated a new China policy in 1972
that led to President Carter's announcement in 1978.
But the records of the executive sessions of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee concerning this treaty, made
public on April of 1978, disclose at several points that
President Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles, and Senator William Fulbright clearly understood
that the term "party" in the treaty termination clause
(Article X) did not refer to the President alone.1 90
Although President Carter's attorneys ignored this
material in their briefs, it was highly relevant to the
resolution of this lawsuit and could be ignored by the
courts only at the risk of inviting the sort of criti-
cism of judges' historical anlysis that was outlined
above.191
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION: SEPARATION OF
POWERS
In the discussion of the "textual commitment" test
of the political question doctrine, I argued above that
the text of the Constitution itself does not support the
theory that the President alone has the power to termi-
nate a treaty. In this section of the article, I exam-
ine in greater detail the constitutional arguments
relied on by President Carter's attorneys. Secondly, I
suggest that the structure of the Constitution and
several provisions in the text indicate a central con-
cern of our constitutional order, the model of separa-
tion of powers, which militates against the concentra-
tion of powers, especially against implied or vaguely
"inherent" powers, in any one branch of government.
190. See Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (historical series) vol. VII, 84th Cong., ist Sess. 65,
285 (1978). See also Exec. Rep. 2, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1978).
191. See text accompanying notes 177-179 supra.
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A. THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT VIEWS
Throughout this article, I have referred to the
attorneys for the defendants in Goldwater v. Carter not
with the familiar designation, "the Government," but
rather as "the President's attorneys." The point of
this designation is neither to be overly fastidious nor
to cast aspersions on the Justice Department, but simply
to highlight that this case involved an inter-branch
conflict. For either party to claim under these circum-
stances to represent "the Government," or more presump-
tuously, "the people," would be to beg the very question
which the third branch of government was called upon to
resolve: should both political branches of government
be involved in treaty termination or does the Constitu-
tion vest that power exclusively in the Executive? In
short, before analyzing the constitutional arguments put
forward by the attorneys for the President, it must be
pointed out that in Goldwater the Justice Department
attorneys were not engaged in their customary task of
defending the legitimacy of an act of Congress or of an
administrative regulation issued pursuant to such an
act, but rather were defending the authority of the
President against a challenge brought by members of a
coordinate branch of government. Bearing in mind that
these attorneys are cabinet or sub-cabinet officers
within the executive branch, 1 9 2 one can readily under-
192. Former Attorney General Griffin Bell argued the case in
the District Court, urging Judge Gasch to dismiss the case as a non-
justiciable political question. Former Assistant Attorney General
Barbara Babcock, who has resumed her position as professor of law
at Stanford, supervised and signed the trial briefs. In her capa-
city as a law professor, Ms. Babcock has been critical of the ex-
cessive use of jurisdictional arguments such as standing, ripeness,
mootness, and political question to keep federal plaintiffs from
reaching the merits of questions they choose to litigate. Assis-
tant Attorney General Alice Daniel assumed responsibility for the
appellate brief. In her former capacity as General Counsel of the
Legal Services Corporation, Ms. Daniel urged greater access to
federal courts. Assistant Attorney General John M. Harmon shared
in the responsibility for the appellate brief. Mr. Harmon was
formerly a law clerk for Justice Powell, who wrote the opinion of
the Court in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, and in Simon v.
E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, elaborating its
new standing requirements. When the Goldwater case went to the
Supreme Court, it was, of course, under the direct supervision of
Solicitor General Wade McCree. To the best of my knowledge, while
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stand why their constitutional outlook was sympathetic
to the President.
President Carter's attorneys put forward a series of
constitutional arguments in support of the proposition
that the Executive alone enjoys the power to terminate
any treaty it wishes. They contended that this power
is derived from "the constitutional allocation of speci-
fic powers to the President" and from the "fact that
the Executive is the branch of Government with plenary
power over the conduct of foreign relations."195 The
"specific powers" to which the brief alluded include
the recognition power, the Commander-in-Chief power, the
appointment and removal power, and the provision requir-
ing the President to take care that the laws are faith-
fully executed. To assertions of these four specific
powers, the Justice Department added an argument con-
cerning the President's "plenary power" over foreign
relations derived, of course, from Justice Sutherland's
dictum in Curtiss-Wright. Each of the five arguments is
seriously flawed.
1. Recognition Power
First, the Justice Department argued that the Presi-
dent may, without the consent of the Senate or the Con-
gress, terminate a treaty as a consequence of his
implied power to recognize foreign governments. As men-
tioned above, the recognition power is a derived power
thought to be implicit in the provision authorizing the
President "to nominate and by and with Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate [to] appoint Ambassadors."194 Al-
though the recognition power is now secure as a presi-
192. (Continued)
serving on the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Judge McCree
did not write any opinions involving standing or the political
question doctrine.
193. Brief for Appellants, supra note 54, at 42.
194. U.S. Const. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
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dential prerogative, 1 9 5 it is not easy to leap from that
implied power to that of treaty termination. First, the
facts involved in Goldwater do not support the claim
that treaty termination is implied in the recognition
power. President Carter never stated that his termina-
tion of the RgC treaty was grounded in his recognition
of the PRC,1 9b but rather based his action on the notice
provision (Article X) of the treaty, on the theory that
"Party" in that provision means "any future President."1 9 7
Second, the legal authority cited by the Justice Depart-
ment does not support the boot-strapping operation which
the Justice Department would have bad the courts perform.
Neither United States v. Belmont1 9onor United States v.
Pink1 99 involved the termination of a treaty; 200 both
195. Although the constitutional text, quoted at note 145
supra, from which the implied power or recognition is derived,
speaks of an interaction or sharing, I do not wish to suggest that
the President-must secure the advice and consent of the Senate be-
fore recognizing a foreign government. For cases referring to the
President's prerogatives under the recognition power, see, e.g.,
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964),
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 212, United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
at 228-230, cited in Goldwoater, 100 S. Ct. at 539 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
196. The chief proponent of the theory that derecognition of
the ROC causes all treaties to pass to the PRC is Professor Jerome
Cohen. See, e.g., Normalization of Relations with the People's
Republic of China: Practical Implications, Hearings Before the
Senate Subconm on Asian and Pacific Affairs 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
81 (1977); Termination of Treaties, supra note 1, at 293-302. This
position is reviewed and refuted in Scheffer, supra note 1, at 944-
66. The Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3316 may fairly
be seen as having robbed Cohen's view of whatever vitality it
previously had. See Taiwan, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (.1979), S. Rep. 96-7 and
H. Conf. Rep. 96-71, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in
[19791 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News 65-718. See also 44 Fed. Reg.
1075 (Jan. 4, 1975).
197. This position is refuted by the history of the negotia-
tions leading up to the initialling of the treaty in 1954, see text
accompanying note 192 supra, and by subsequent legislative history
of the senatorial participation in the process of making the treaty
effective, see text accompanying note 193 supra.
198. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
199. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
200. For a statement of my views on executive agreements from
Theodore Roosevelt to Richard Nixon, see Treaty Termination, supra
note 13, at 490-94.
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cases dealt with executive agreements, not treaties, In
these cases, then, the Court merely ruled that when the
President entered into a valid executive agreement with a
foreign government, that agreement would, under the
supremacy clause (which includes treaties), take prece-
dence over conflicting state law.
2. Commander-in-Chief Power
Another argument employed by the Justice Department
was that the President alone has the power to terminate
treaties because he is the "Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy."20 1 In resting the treaty termination
power on this provision, the President's attorneys have,
perhaps unwittingly, made a concession that the presi-
dential prerogative to terminate treaties is confined to
defense treaties or to treaties involving the military
forces. The chief flaw with the argument, however, is
that one can as easily argue from the enumerated congres-
sional powers "to provide for the common Defence "2 0 2 "to
declare War,"203 "to raise and support Armies,"26 4 and
"to provide and maintain a Navy," 205 that if Congress
ought to participate in the policy judgment leading up to
the termination of treaties, the kind of treaty in which
it has a direct and constitutionally grounded interest is
a mutual defense treaty. The consequences of the termi-
nation of a military alliance, especially with a friendly
nation, can easily implicate all of the above-mentioned
congressional duties. 206 In short, this argument fails
to take into account the deliberate tension between the
branches created by the framers when they made the Presi-
dent the Commander-in-Chief (or the "first general and
admiral of the Confederacy," 20 7 as Hamilton put it) but
left major decisionmaking concerning military affairs in
the hands of Congress.
201. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
202. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
203. Id. at cl. 11. See T. Eagleton, War and Presidential
Power: A Chronicle of Congressional Surrender (1974); J. Javits,
Who Makes War (1973); L. Tribe, supra note 118, at 172-81.
204. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
205. Id. at cl. 13.
206. See Treaty Termination, supra note 13, at 290-97 (testi-
mony of Professor Alan Swan).
207. See The Federalist No. 68 (A. Hamilton), The Federalist
Papers 418 (C. Rossiter, ed. 1961).
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The Supreme Court did not accept the Justice
Department's argument that the Commander-in-Chief
power authorized the President to act without any
authority from Congress to take possession of private
property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping
production of military weapons during the Korean war.208
In Goldwater, the courts rejected the claims of exclu-
sive presidential power over treaty termination derived
from a similarly inflated view of the Commander-in-
Chief power.2 0 9
3. Appointment and Removal Power
The President's attorneys also argued that the
pattern of authority in the process of treaty notifica-
tion and termination was analogous to that in the presi-
dential appointment and removal powers. The Senate must
approve the appointment of certain government officials.
There is no requirement of congressional or senatorial
participation in decisions to remove those officials.
The President's attorneys suggested parallel patterns
of participation in treaty ratification and termination.
Judge Gasch rejected this argument because the removal
of a subordinate officer who refuses to carry out the
Executive's designs is consistent with the duty placed
upon the Executive to take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed, whereas "treaty termination impacts
upon the substantial role of Congress in foreign
affairs ... and is a contradiction rather than a
corollary of the Executive's enforcement obligations."'2 1
0
The argument based on the appointment and removal
powers was renewed by the Justice Department lawyers
before the appellate court and the Supreme Court, but
neither court gave the argument much attention. Perhaps
this was because the appellants-respondents had asked the
relevant case authority to carry more weight than it
208. 343 U.S. at 587.
209. See Berger, War Making by the President, 121 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 29 (1972); Treaty Termination, supra note 206.
210. 481 F. Supp. at 960.
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would bear. Myers v. United States 2 1 1 is a slender
reed on which to rest the weighty proposition that a
President may terminate unilaterally any treaty he
views as inappropriate or impolitic.2 12 Frank Myers
was a Democratic postmaster in Portland, Oregon, ap-
pointed in the Wilson administration and fired by War-
ren Harding's Postmaster General in violation of a
statute which required senatorial participation in the
process of removal of postmasters from office. Chief
Justice Taft ruled that statute unconstitutional. 213
In so doing, Taft rambled on for seventy pages of
"history that is neither right nor relevant" and of
argumentation which was "largely an insubstantial
shield for political values" because "other appropriate
vehicles of interpretation for reaching its conclusion
[were] largely lacking."l214 The leading constitutional
commentator of the day, Edwin S. Corwin severely criti-
cized Taft's sloppy history in Myers. 21 Moreover,
without overruling Myers, a unanimous Court retreated
from its extravagant rhetoric less than a decade later
in Humphrey's Executor v. United States.21 6  As Profes-
sor Charles Miller has stated:
The postmaster removal case was flawed
by history in two ways. First, the
history related by the Court was poor
211. 272 U.S. 52 (1926), cited in Brief for Respondents,
supra note 38, at 15.
212. "Postmasters of the first, second, and third
class shall be appointed and may be removed
by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate and shall hold their
offices for four years unless sooner removed
or suspended according to law."
Act of July 12, 1876, 19 Stat. 80, 81. The provision was ruled
unconstitutional in Myers, 272 U.S. at 176.
213. 272 U.S. at 63-64.
214. C. Miller, Presidential Removal Power: The First Con-
gress as Constitutional Interpreter, in The Supreme Court and the
Uses of History 52, 68 (1969).
215. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under
the Constitution, 27 Colum. L. Rev. 353 (1927).
216. "Whether the power of the President to remove an offi-
cer shall prevail over the authority of Congress to condition the
power by fixing a definite term and precluding a removal except
for cause, will depend upon the character of the office." 295 U.S.
602, 631 (1935) (invalidating President Roosevelt's attempt to
remove a member of Federal Trade Commission). See also Wiener v.
United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); L. Tribe, supra note 118, at
187.
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history. Second, and more important,
history . . was really the Court's only
principle of adjudication. The failure
to offer additional justification for the
Myers holding brought into question its
constitutional adequacy from the time it
was announced. The historical discussion
so weighed down the opinion that it was
in constant danger of disappearing from
the surface of contemporary constitutional
law--which it soon did. 217
Judge Gasch rightly rejected the analogy to the
presidential removal power as unpersuasive. It would be
unfair to the memory of Chief Justice Taft to resurrect
one of his sloppiest opinions, already given decent, if
unceremonious, burial and expect it to serve as a per-
suasive rationale for presidential hegemony over treaty
termination. "To the victor belong the spoils" might
have adequately reflected the mood in 1925 of a jolly
former President turned Chief Justice who did not wish
to impede the distribution of political favors by a fel-
low Republican. But this attitude towards tenure in
office is now discredited even with respect to employ-
ment in the Postal Service. Unless President Carter's
lawyers view our treaty obligations as among the politi-
cal plums to be distributed by a new president, the
Myers rationale simply will not do as a basis for asser-
ting the concentration of all treaty termination power
in the Oval Office.
4. The Take Care Clause and the Supremacy
Clause
In my opinion, the most puzzling and least persua-
sive constitutional argument articulated by the Justice
Department attorneys was the claim that President Carter
derived his authority to unilaterally terminate a treaty
from the requirement that the President "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed" (Take Care clause).2 1 8
Perhaps this argument is best seen as a play on the word
"executed." The normal sense of the term refers to
217. C. Miller, supra note 214, at 70.
218. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. For a statement of the Jus-




carrying out or implementing, but the Justice Depart-
ment brief, perhaps written by someone fresh from re-
search on capital punishment, uses the term "faithfully
executed" to mean "terminated."
Three reasons lead me to the conclusion that a
lighthearted interpretation of this argument is more
plausible than a serious one. First, the author of the
argument tipped his hand that he was not serious when
he compared a mutual defense treaty to a government
lease or contract whl can easily be annulled without
consulting Congress.2 - Second, if correct, this argu-
ment proves too much. The argument would result in all
treaties being subject to unilateral termination by the
President. I seems unlikely that the Take Care clause
was intended to grant the President a power that, if
unilaterally exercised, could so destabilize United
States foreign relations.
The argument from the Take Care clause is further
weakened by the fact that, unless one accepts the pun
on "executed," the clause means that the Executive is
duty bound to carry out the policies and obligations
contained in treaties. This seems to me to be an impli-
cation which may fairly be derived from the supremacy
clause, which declares treaties as well as the federal
Constitution and federal statutes to AS the "supreme
Law of the Land" (supremacy clause). Article V makes
clear byond cavil that the Executive powerless to
alter or amend the Constitution on his own. Still less
is he empowered to "execute" the Constitution in the
sense of terminating it as the chief instrument of our
public order.
The Constitution is silent on the method of repeal-
ing federal statutes, but no Executive in modern Anglo-
American constitutional history since Charles I has uni-
laterally attempted to repeal a statute and stayed in
power. Given a constitutional system which explicitly
limits the President's role in the process of constitu-
219. Id. at 68.
220. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land...." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.2. For
comments on this provision, see Treaty Termination, supra note 13,
at 40 (remarks of Senator Goldwater), at 274 (remarks of Professor
Franck), and at 515 (testimony of Professor Gaffney).
221. U.S. Const. art V.
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tional amendment and which, at least customarily, denies
him the power to repeal a statute without congressional
authorization, I fail to see how the Constitution's silence
as to a precise mode of treaty termination can be inter-
preted to grant the President unilateral termination power.
Professor Louis Henkin has suggested that the in-
terpretation of the supremacy clause advanced here is
flawed because the clause is directed not to the Execu-
tive, but to the courts, and because treaties are men-
tioned there "principally for the purpose of declaring2 2 2
treaties supreme in relation to state law and policy."
In his view, to call treaties "supreme" in the sense of
binding the Executive is but another play on words.
Three counterarguments are possible. First, I
think the strengtq of the theory that treaties are
generally binding 23 on the Executive derives not from
the supremacy clause exclusively, but from the confla-
tion of that clause with the Take Care clause. Second,
if the argument is merely a play on words, it is at
least an old one. Thomas Jefferson wrote as follows in
the Rules and Manual of the Senate: "Treaties being
declared equally with the laws of the United States, to
be the supreme Law of the Land, it is understood that
an act of the legislatu 5.alone can declare them in-
fringed and rescinded." Third, some commentators
have suggested that the President may abrogate a treaty
without consultation of Congress only at the peril of
being impeached and removed for so doing.2 2 5  In support
of this view, there is sound historical evidence in the
form of several speeches of delegates to the state
222. Henkin, supra note 14, at 653.
223. Even the version of S. Res. 15 reported by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on May 7, 1979, but never voted on by
the Senate, rejects complete presidential hegemony over the process
of treaty termination. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
224. T. Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice for
the Use of the Senate of the United States, Sec. L. 11 (1801), as
reprinted in Senate Manual, S. Doc. No. 93-1, 93d Cong., ist Sess.
560 (1973).
225. See, e.g., R. Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional
Problems (1973); Emerson, supra note 166, at 77.
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conventions called to ratify the Constitution.22
6 It
is, of course, most unlikely that the impeachment
mechanism would be invoked to remove a President from
office because of an unlawful termination of a treaty,
especially if the President enjoys the support of a
majority in either the House or the Senate.2 2 7 Hence
the outcome of the Goldwater litigation will determine
to a great extent whether Congress will be able to play
a significant role in the termination of treaties in
the future.
5. Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs
A fifth constitutional argument used by the Justice
Department attorneys was that presidential hegemony over
treaty termination is consonant with the Executive's
plenary power over foreign affairs. This view is derived
from the extravagant dictum in Curtiss-Wright, As noted
above, the holding in this case rejected the attack made
by a criminal defendant upon the delegation of a power
which the Congress had specifically entrusted by law to
the Executive.
Moreover, several provisions of the Constitution
entrust important foreign policy functions to the legis-
lative branch.2 2 0 In light of these explicit textual
226. See 3,4 J. Elliot, ed., Debates in the Several State
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution vol.3, at
240 (Nicholas); at 516 4adison); vol. 4, at 124 (Spaight); at 276
(E. Rutledge); and at 281 (C.C. Pinckney). For further evidence of
Madison's view that the President could not act alone to terminate
a treaty, see Letter of James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, Jan. 2,
1791, 1 Letters and Other writings of James Madison 524 (1865).
Madison is incorrectly cited in the Hansell Memorandum, supra note
171, at 195, as being the first President to unilaterally terminate
a treaty. In 1815, the new state of the Netherlands denounced our
1782 Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United Netherlands as
having expired because the state with whom it was made no longer
existed. See also S. Crandall, Treaties: Their Making and Enforce-
ment 429 (1916). For Madison's views on treaty termination, see
Emerson, supra note 166, at 51-52.
227. See Broderick, Citizens' Guide to Impeachment's Problem
Areas, 23 Cath. U.L. Rev. 205 (1973).
228. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 88, at 36 n.l.
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commitments of major foreign affairs responsibility to
the Congress, the argument based on presidential con-
trol over foreign affairs falls apart as too undiffer-
entiated and unsophisticated. Professor Irwin Rhodes
has asked: "If the President cannot, on his sole ini-
tiative, amend a treaty, how can it be claimed that he
can annul one? If the lesser act is wrong, how can the
greater be right?" 2 2 9 These questions cannot be effec-
tively laid to rest merely by citing Justice Suther-
land's expansive and unnecessary dictum in Curtiss-
Wright. Still less can an effective response be
fashioned by listing the number of scholars who uncri-
tically repeat the dictum or its sentiment as the sole
apparent basis of their opinion in favor of a presiden-
tial prerogative to terminate treaties. 2 3 0 Saying that
something is so does not make it so. 2 3 1 In Bum the chief
flaw in the argument based on the President's "plenary
power" in foreign affairs is that it begs the question
and so fails to account for two important realities:
The nature of the treaty termination process as a series
of acts with room for several actors at various stages, 2 3 2
and the explicit commitment of many foreign affairs
powers to the Congress. As Judge Gasch stated in his
opinion of October 17:
[Tihe President's status as the
nation's spokesman and representative
in foreign affairs cannot serve as the
basis for exclusive executive power
over the entire process of treaty
termination. While the President may
be the sole organ of communication
with foreign governments, he is clearly
not the sole maker of foreign policy.
In short, the conduct of foreign affairs
is not a plenary executive power.2 3 3
Or, as Justice Jackson stated with reference to the con-
229. Treaty Termination, supra note 13, at 37.
230. Id.
231. Chief Justice Taney's regrettable characterization of
blacks as non-persons in Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,
404-06, 417-20 (1817), illustrates this point.
232. See Treaty Termination, supra note 13, at 289-95 (testi-
mony of Professor Reisman). See also Reisman and McDougal, Who Can
Terminate Mutual Defense Treaties?, in Nat'l L. J. at 19 (May 21,
1979); and Can the President Unilaterally End Treaties?, in Nat'l L.
J. at 17 (May 28, 1979).
233. 481 F. Supp. at 961.
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stitutional provision2 34 which vests executive power in
the President: I cannot accept the view that this
clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive
power but regard it as an allocation to the presidential
office of the generic powers thereafter stated.2 3 5
B. THE MODEL OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
As I have attempted to show in my comments on the
Justice Department's constitutional arguments, the
search for relevant and compelling legal precedents in
a case of first impression is always a difficult task
and often yields arguments based on weak analogies. I
make no claim to be able to cite crystal-clear legal
authority for the desirability or necessity of congres-
sional participation in treaty termination. But a
plausible argument can be made that Congress or the
Senate should have some voice in the formation of the
national policy leading up to the termination of a
treaty.
First, a congressional role in treaty termination
is inferable from the very fact that the President
alone cannot make a treaty. 236 As Alexander Hamilton
234. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America" U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
235. 343 U.S. at 641 (1952)(Jackson, J., concurring).
Jackson had served as a justice in the Nuremburg Tribunal on War
Crimes. This personal experience may explain his pointed refer-
ence to Fascist theories of unlimited executive power: "[I]f we
seek instruction from our own times, we can match it only from the
executive powers in those governments we disparagingly describe as
totalitarian." Id.
236. "He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur...." U.S. Const. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 1. See Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of
Foreign Affairs: The Intent of the Constitution Historically
Examined, 5 Seton Hall L. Rev. 527 (1974).
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wrote in Federalist 75:
The particular nature of the power of
making treaties indicates a peculiar
propriety in the union [of the Executive
with the Senate]. Though several writers
on the subject of government place that
power in the class of executive authorities,
yet this is evidently an arbitrary dis-
position; for if we attend carefully to
its operation it will be found to partake
more of the legislative than of the execu-
tive character, though it does not seem
strictly to fall within the definition of
either of them. . . . The history of human
conduct does not warrant the exalted
opinion of human virtue which would make
it wise in a nation to commit interests
of so delicate and momentous a kind, as
those which concern its intercourse with
the rest of the world, to the sole dis-
posal of a magistrate created and circum-
stances as would be a President of the
United States. 2 37
In Federalist 75, Hamilton was writing of the
making rather than the unmaking of treaties. When, in
1793, the leader of the Federalists, President George
Washington, issued a proclamation of neutrality with
respect to France, Hamilton wrote a letter which appears
to support the ability of a President to suspend the
operation of a treaty in the limited situation of a
rebellion in a foreign country which requires a judg-
ment "whether the new rulers are competent organs of
the national will.",23 8 The Justice Department lawyers
distorted this carefully limited utterance into a bold
but erroneous claim before the Court of Appeals that
Hamilton believed that the President has exclusive
responsibility for terminating treaties. 2 39
237. The Federalist No. 75 (A. Hamilton), supra note 207,
at 450-51.
238. Letters of Pacificus and Helvidius on the Proclamation
of Neutrality 12-13 (1845).
239. Brief for Appellants, supra note 54, at 50 n. 32,
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This overly generalized claim is unreliable for
three reasons. First, Hamilton was an ardent supporter
of separation of powers. 2 40 Second, the treaties can-
celled as a result of the French Revolution can hardly
be cited as an instance of presidential hegemony over
treaty termination. On the contrary, the cancellation
in 1798 of four Franco-American treaties was effected
primarily by Congress, with no further notice thought
to be required or actually given by President John
Adams. 24 1 Third, .Hamilton's co-author of the Federalist
Papers, John Jay, later to serve as the first Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, wrote in
Federalist 64 concerning the unmaking of treaties:
"They who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal
them; and it will not be disputed that the who make
treaties may alter or cancel them ... ,,2%2
Irrespective of whether the framers of our Consti-
tution ever explicitly applied the concept of separa-
tion of powers to the process of treaty termination,
they bequeathed us a constitutional structure in which
powers often overlap so as to avoid lodging absolute
governmental power in any one branch. My opinion is
that some form of congressional or senatorial participa-
tion in appropriate stages of the process of treaty
termination is both desirable and necessary as constitu-
tional policy. I derive this conclusion from my
reading of the Steel Seizure Case, the Pentagon Papers
Case, and U.S. v. Nixon, and from three recent legisla-
240. See The Federalist No. 9 (A. Hamilton), supra note 207,
at 72; The Federalist No. 66 (A. Hamilton, id. at 401-2; The
Federalist No. 79 (A. Hamilton), id. at 472; The Federalist No. 81
(A. Hamilton), id. at 483. See also The Federalist Nos. 47 and 48
(J. Madison), id. at 300-13.
241. See Emerson, supra note 166, at 52-53; Scheffer, supra
note 1, at 995-96.
242. The Federalist No. 64 (J. Jay), supra note 207, at 394
(emphasis supplied). According to Professor Richard B. Morris,
the editor of The Papers of John Jay, the original draft of The
Federalist No. 64 contained the following sentence in Jay's hand-
writing: "With respect to the responsibility of the President and
Senate [to alter or cancel treaties], it is difficult to conceive
how it could be increased." It cannot be argued that by deleting
this sentence from the final version, Jay intended to vest control
over the treaty termination process solely in the Executive. Pro-
fessor Morris has stated recently his opinion that "Throughout
[Federalist 64] Jay is talking about treaty-making as a shared
function, and it is a fair inference from his text that he would
have regarded treaty termination in the same light." 125 Cong. Rec.
S15718 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1979).
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lative developments: the impoundment controversy, the
war powers resolution, and the 1979 hearings on treaty
termination before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee.
1. The Steel Seizure Case
Three aspects of the Steel Seizure Case are rele-
vant to the Goldwater case. First the case demonstrated
how swiftly the courts can act in an impending constitu-
tional crisis.243 Second, it showed that judges need
not be cowed by alarmist predictions of "catastrophic"
consequences, "tragedy," and "disaster"244 if the Court
declined to rule in favor of the President's assertion
of inherent power to act without statutory authority to
"seize" and operate the steel mills idled by a labor-
management dispute. Third, several of the Justices
took the opportunity in the Steel Seizure Case to arti-
culate their positions on the core constitutional value
of the separation of powers.245 As Justice Frankfurter
243. On April 9, 1952, President Truman issued Executive
Order 10340, directing his Secretary of Commerce, Charles Sawyer,
to take possession of most of the country's steel mills and keep
them running. 16 Fed. Reg. 3503 (1952). The President reported
his action to Congress the following day. 98 Cong. Rec. 3962 (April
9, 1952), and sent the Congress a second message on the matter
twelve days later. Id. at 4192 (Apr. 21, 1952). The steel
companies obeyed the Secretary's orders under protest and sought
injunctive and declaratory relief in the District Court for the
District of Columbia. The district court issued a preliminary
injunction on April 30. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 103
F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1952). On the same day, the court of appeals
stayed the injunction. 197 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1952), On May 3,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 343 U.S. 937. The Court
heard oral argument on May 12 and 13, and the case was decided on
June 2, 1952. 343 U.S. 579.
244. The Government produced affidavits from nine executive
department heads predicting severe consequences if President
Truman's Executive Order were not upheld by the Court. See Brief
for Appellees, supra note 33, at 41 n.l.
245. The issues in Goldwater clearly raise a separation of
powers question. The constitutional value represented by the
separation of powers doctrine was among plaintiff's principal con-
cerns in the case. Underlying the American constitutional scheme
of separated powers are mistrust of concentrated governmental
authority and fear of its political consequences. Legislators,
and every other actor in the democratic system, must take care




observed in Youngstown, "The accretion of dangerous
power does not come in a day. It does come, however
slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disre-
gard of the restrictions that fence in even the most
dis-interested assertion of authority."246
Given the reality of the Korean conflict, it might
be plausibly argued that President Truman thought he
was acting within his executive authority in ordering
his Secretary of Commerce to continue the operation of
the steel mills after the steel industry had rejected
the recommendations of the Wage-Price Stabilization
Board.247 The Supreme Court, however, found that the
order violated the constitutional doctrine of separa-
tion of powers. The case generated seven opinions from
the Justices. Only the dissent was united in an
opinion written by Chief Justice Vinson. Perhaps the
most useful of all the opinions for resolution of the
question of treaty termination is the concurrence of
Justice Jackson, who wrote that presidential authority
is at its maximum when the President acts pursuant to
an express or implied authorization of Congress, in a
twilight zone of uncertainty when the President acts
in the absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, and at its lowest ebb when the
President takes measures incompatible with the ex-
pressed or implied will of Congress.248
According to Larry Hammond, the Deputy Assistant
Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, Jus-
tice Jackson's "zone of twilight" analysis cannot be
read to support congressional action where the Consti-
246. 343 U.S. at 594 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
247. See M. Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case: The
Limits of Presidential Power (1977); Black, Book Review, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 9, 1977, § 7 (Review of Books) at 26. For a critical analysis
of the case, see Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick
Without Straw, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 53 (1953); Freund, Foreword: The
Year of the $tee4 Cas.e, 66 Uarv f L, Rev, 90 (1952),
248, 343 US, At 635-41 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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tution itself is silent.2 49 Hammond's point is somewhat
puzzling, for no one doubts that the President would be
at the lowest ebb of his power (i.e., he would have none)
were he to attempt to repeal a statute without congres-
sional approval, even though the Constitution says not a
word about the process of annulling or repealing a
statute. In any event, the Steel Seizure Case should
have been instructive, if not controlling, in Goldwater;
the former six Justices clearly repudiated the Presi-
dent's claims that he enjoys inherent powers nowhere
granted him in Article II and that prior "seizures" by
other Presidents amounted to the legitimation of such a
presidential power by way of custom and congressional
acquiescence.
2. The Pentagon Papers Case
New York Times v. United States 2 50 is instructive
in Goldwater for three reasons. First, as in the Steel
Seizure Case and the Pentagon Papers Case, the Supreme
Court moved swiftly in the face of a serious crisis. 2 5 1
The Court did not, however, move swiftly enough for four
249. Letter from Larry A. Hammond to Senator Frank Church,
no date, reprinted in Treaty Termination, supra note 13, at 219-20.
In this letter Hammond offered Church his opinion that the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee had committed "fundamental error" in
applying Justice Jackson's "zone of twilight" analysis in its report
accompanying the Taiwan Relations Act, S. Rep. No. 96-7, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 18-19 (1979), reprinted in [1979] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 667-68.
250. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See Henkin, The Right to Know
and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120
U. Pa. L. Rev. 271 (1971).
251. On June 13, 1971 the New York Times began publishing
portions of a classified history of American involvement in Vietnam
known as the Pentagon Papers. Two days later the Government sought
an injunction against further publication of this document. A
parallel suit was initiated against the Washington Post when it be-
gan to publish this material on June 18. By June 23, the Second
Circuit had ruled in favor of the Government, United States v. N.Y.
Times, 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971), and the D.C. Circuit had ruled
in favor of the Post, United States v. Wash. Post, 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). On June 25, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
both cases. 403 U.S. 942 (1971). Oral argument was heard on the
following day. On June 30, 1971, the Court issued a per curiam
order authorizing immediate publication of the controverted materials.
The order was accompanied by nine separate opinions. 403 U.S. 713
(1971).
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Justices, 2 5 2 but three others felt it had acted with
"frenetic haste" and "inadequate time to ponder great
issues." 2 53 Second, most of the Justices again seemed
unruffled by the Government's threats of dire conse-
quences to our national security, prolongation of the
Vietnam War, and further delay in the freeing of Ameri-
can prisoners of war if the Court were not to authorize
prior restraint upon publication of the Penagon Papers.254
Third, the theme of separation of powers resurfaced
as a vital component in the opinions of Justices
Stewart, 2 5 5 White,25 6 and Marshall. 2 57 Justices
252. On June 25, 1971, Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and
Marshall dissented from the grants of certiorari, urged summary
action, and stated that they "would not continue the restraint" on
the newspapers. 403 U.S. at 943. See aZso 403 U.S. at 714-15
(Black, J., concurring) and 403 U.S. at 724-25 (Brennan, J., con-
curring).
253. "[T~he frenetic haste is due in large part to the man-
ner in which the Times proceeded from the date it obtained the pur-
loined documents. It seems reasonably clear now that the haste
precluded reasonable and deliberate judicial treatment of these
cases and was not warranted...." Id. at 749 (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting); id. at 753 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
254. "I hope that damage has not already been done, If,
however, damage has been done, and if, with the Court's action to-
day, these newspapers proceed to publish the critical documents and
there results therefrom 'the death of soldiers, the destruction of
alliances, the greatly increased difficulty of negotiation with our
enemies, the inability of our diplomats to negotiate, to which list
I might add the factors of prolongation of the war and of further
delay in the freeing of United States prisoners', then the Nation's
people will know where the responsibility for these sad consequences
rests." Id. at 763 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
255. In a curious opinion, Justice Stewart suggested that
the separation of powers problem was that the Executive, which in
his view is given "a large degree of unshared power in the conduct
of foreign affairs," had asked the courts "to perform a function
that the Constitution gave to the Executive, not the Judiciary,"
Id. at 729 (Stewart, J., concurring).
256. "At least in the absence of legislation by Congress,
based on its own investigations and findings, I am quite unable to
agree that inherent powers of the Executive and the courts reach
so far as to authorize remedies having such sweeping potential for
inhibiting publications by the press...." Id. at 732 (White, J.,
concurring),
257. "It would ... be utterly inconsistent with the concept
of separation of powers for this Court to use its power of contempt
to prevent behavior that Congress has specifically declined to
prohibit." Id. at 742 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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Black,25 8 Douglas, 2 5 9 and Brennan26 0 all unequivocally
rejected the Executive's expansive claim to "inherent
power" to seek to enjoin publication of the controverted
material.
3. United States v. Nixon
Like the Steel Seizure Case and Pentagon Papers cases,
United States v. Nixon26 l rovides an example of how the
Justices can act swiftly 26 when they deem it neces-
258. "To find that the President has 'inherent power' to halt
the publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe out
the First Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty and
security of the very people the Government hopes to make 'secure'."
Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
259. "[The First Amendment] leaves, in my view, no room for
governmental restraint on the press. There is, moreover, no statute
barring the publication of the material which the Times and Post seek
to use .... The Government says that it has inherent powers to go
into court and obtain an injunction to protect the national interest,
which in this case is alleged to be national security. Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, repudiated that expansive doctrine in no
uncertain terms." Id. at 720-723 (Douglas, J., concurring).
260. "The entire thrust of the Government's claim throughout
these cases has been that publication of the material sought to be
enjoined 'could,' or 'might,' or 'may' prejudice the national
interest in various ways. But the First Amendment tolerates abso-
lutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon
surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result." Id.
at 725-26 (Brennan, J., concurring).
261. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
262. On May 20, 1974, Judge Sirica denied President Nixonis
motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum directing the President to
produce certain tape recordings and documents relating to his con-
versations with aides and advisers who had been indicted because
of their participation in one phase or another of "Watergate." On
May 24, the President appealed from the district court to the
D.C. Circuit. Later that day, the Watergate Special Prosecutor
filed a petition for writ of certiorari before judgment. One
week later, that petition was granted with an expedited briefing
schedule. Oral argument was heard on July 8, and the case was
decided on July 24, 1974. On July 27, 29, and 30 the House
Judiciary Committee adopted three articles of impeachment. On
August 5, the President released the transcripts of 64 tape
recordings, among which was the "smoking gun" of a conversation
146 [VOL. 6
sary.2 6 3 It also provides another example of the ability
of the Court to differentiate between a controversy
with manifest ramifications in the political order and
a nonjusticiable "political question," for in Nixon
eight Justices2 6 4 were willing to assume their judicial
function of "saying what the law is" in a difficult case
of first impression.26 5 Finally, the result reached in
Nixon should have been instructive in Goldwater. In
Nixon, a unanimous Court in a single opinion written by
Chief Justice Burger26 6 rejected President Nixon's inter-
pretation of the doctrine of separation of powers claim-
ing an absolute executive privilege to withhold the r
quested tapes and documents from the District Court.2 7
None of these cases is so directly on point in
Goldwater that it should have controlled the outcome of
that litigation. None, of course, involved treaty termi-
nation. But all of them were ambivalent in that they in-
volved not simply domestic issues2 6 8 but also, according
262. (Continued)
in the Oval Office on June 23, 1972, six days after the break-in
at the offices of the Democratic National Committee by employees
of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President. On August
9, President Nixon resigned from office.
263. It also illustrates that the Court can survive the
criticism of legal scholars for so acting. Professor Gerald
Gunther criticized the Court's decision to bypass full considera-
tion of the case by the circuit court, because this expedited
review had the effect of aborting the impeachment process which
was going forward at the time. See Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and
Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process,
22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 30 (1974). For a contrasting view, supporting
the Court's decision to grant expedited review, see Miskin, Great
Cases and Soft Law: A Comment on United States v. Nixon. 22
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 76 (1974).
264. Justice Rehnquist recused himself, perhaps because he
had served as a former Assistant Attorney General under John
Mitchell, one of the defendants in the case in chief. 418 U.S. at
716, 904.
265. Id. at 692-97 (no political question), and at 703-709
(citing Marbury).
266. For an account of the contributions of the Associate
Justices to the Chief Justice's effort in this case, see B. Wood-
ward and S. Armstrong, The Brethren 308-47 (1979).
267. 418 U.S. at 705-707.
268. See Steel Seizure Case (the government operation of
steel mills); Pentagon Papers (the prior restraint of publication);
U.S. v. Nixon (compliance with a subpoena of evidence).
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to the allegation of the Executive in all three cases,
weighty matters of our foreign policy.26 9 In each of
the three cases, the Court rejected the theory that the
Executive had an inherent power to act, either without
congressional authorization as in the Steel Seizure Case
and Pentagon Papers or contrary to an explicit enactment
of the Congress as in Nixon. In short, these three
cases contain many lessons for those who wish to read
the silence of the constitutional text on the process of
treaty termination to mean that it vests exclusively in
the Executive because of some inherent power as Comman-
der-in-Chief or as organ and representative of the na-
tion on the execution or conduct of our foreign affairs.
Because the Court in the Steel Seizure Case, Pentagon
Papers, and Nixon reasoned that the silence of the con-
stitutional text implied shared power rather than exclu-
sive and absolute executive power, it is somewhat bewil-
dering that President Carter's attorneys did such a weak
job of distinguishing the Steel Seizure Case 27 0 and did
not bother to discuss Pentagon Papers or Nixon at all.
It is also disappointing that the Justices themselves
paid little or no attention to these precedents.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS FROM LEGISLATIVE EXPERIENCE
Probably because of the power of judicial review
of legislative enactments or executive acts, judges are
accorded considerable deference in the function of de-
claring what the law is. But public officials in both
of the political branches take the same oath to support
the Constitution as do judges, and attention must be
paid to the substantive meaning of the Constitution
which emerges from the experience of the nonjudicial
actors in our constitutional order. 271 Specifically,
constitutional law can be enriched by focusing on the
recent efforts of the Congress to maintain a tension be-
tween the roles of the executive and the legislative
branches of government in three areas: war powers, im-
poundment of appropriated funds, and treaty termination.
269. The availability of military weapons to U.N. forces in
South Korea, the prosecution of American intervention in Vietnam,
and the ability to conduct confidential discussions with foreign
diplomats were at issue in SteeZ Seizure Case, Pentagon Papers and
U.S. v. Nixon, respectively.
270. Brief for Appellants, supra note 54, at 21.
271. See Linde, supra note 152; L. Tribe, supra note 118,
at 13-14, 27-28.
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1. War Powers Resolution
Some commentators have criticized the War Powers
Resolution 2 72as an excessive intrusion by the Congress
into a domain properly belonging to the Commander-in-
Chief. If this Act be extreme, it must be acknowledged
that there was at least some presidential hubris in-
volved in continuing a full-scale military operation
which was never declared as a war by the Congress. For
this reason, the procedural requirement that the Execu-
tive promptly submit to the Congress a written report of
the reasons for the introduction of our armed forces in-
to hostilities or into the territory of a foreign nation
for combat purposes, strikes me as a legitimate means of
restoring the tension of powers which lies at the heart
of our constitutional structure. 27 3
Those who voted to enact the War Powers Resolution
over the veto of President Nixon 274 were surely assert-
ing that Congress must have a major voice in the deter-
mination of our foreign policy. Evidently, some of
these Congressmen such as Senators Church, Javits, and
Kennedy now wish to assert that the best public policy
is to reserve to the Executive the function of treaty
termination. Yet no principled explanation appears as
to why it is appropriate for Congress to assert control
over the sending of armed forces abroad absent a decla-
ration of war, but inappropriate to assert congressional
participation in decisions concerning the conduct of
armed forces which we may have committed to another
friendly nation's defense by means of a treaty. The two
decisions are indistinguishable in this context. The
constitutional model of separation of powers calls for
congressional participation in both decisions.
272. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1976). The literature on this
question is voluminous. See, e.g., Rodino, CongressionaZl Review
of Eecutive Action, 5 Seton Hall L. Rev, 489, 498-
502, 513-17 (1974); Note, 1973 War Powers Legislation: Congress
Re-Asserts Its WParmakiig Power, 5 Loy. Chi. L.J. 83 (1974); Van
Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War, 121
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1972); Berger, supra note 211 and Bickel, Congress,
the President and the Power to Wage War, 48 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 131
(1971).
273. See L. Tribe, supra note 118, at 172-81.
274. The vote to override the President's veto was 75 in
favor and 18 against in the Senate, 119 Cong. Rec. 9661 (daily ed.
Nov. 7, 1973), and 284 in favor and 135 against in the House. Id.
at 20015.
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2. Impoundment
Throughout American history, Presidents have exer-
cised discretion, often explicitly authorized by the
terms of an appropriations enactment, not to spend all
the funds authorized for various purposes. After repea-
ted conflicts with the Congress over impoundment of
funds, President Nixon announced at a news conference at
the beginning of his second term that he thought he had
an "absolutely clear" inherent constitutional right to
impound funds even in the face of a mandatory spending
directive from Congress. As Justice Jackson would have
put it--and as future events would show--Nixon had moved
beyond the "zone of twilight" to the "lowest ebb" of his
powers. President Nixon's expansive claims did not en-
joy the support of his own constitutional law expert,
William Rehnquist, then Assistant Attorney General for
the office of Legal Counsel and subsequently appointed
by Nixon to the Supreme Court. 2 75
275. In December of 1969, Rehnquist prepared a memorandum
concerning presidential authority to impound funds appropriated for
assistance to federally aided schools. In this memorandum Rehn-
quist wrote:
With respect to the suggestion that the Presi-
dent has a constitutional power to decline
to spend appropriated funds, we must conclude
that existence of such a broad power is sup-
ported by neither reason nor precedent....
It is in our view extremely difficult to
formulate a constitutional theory to justify
a refusal by the President to comply with a
Congressional directive to spend. It may
be argued that the spending of money is in-
herently an executive function, but the exe-
cution of any law is, by definition, an exe-
cutive function, and it seems an anomalous
proposition that because the Executive branch
is bound to execute the laws, it is free to
decline to execute them.
Cited in Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds, Hearings Be-
fore the Subcorm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comn. on
the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See generally Note,
Presidential Impoundment: Constitutional Theories and Political
Realities,61 Geo. L. J. 1295 (1973); and Note, Impoundment of Funds
- The Courts, the Congress, and the President: A Constitutional
Triangle, 69 Nw. L. Rev. 335 (1974).
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Nixon also met with strong opposition in Congress.
This clash culminated in the passage of the Congressional
Budgeting and Impounding Control Act of 1974,276 signed
by Nixon in July of 1974, during the pendency of impeach-
ment proceedings against the President. Like the War
Powers Resolution, the Impounding Control Act is an im-
portant statement by the Congress that the doctrine of
separation of powers does not allow the Executive to
exercise a governmental function entrusted by the Con-
stitution to both the legislative and executive branches.
The arguments set forth above all make a plausible
case for some congressional role in treaty termination.
The impoundment controversy and the statute it produced
did not, of course, control the result2 7 7 in Goldwater.
But they did offer an important, if extrajudicial, state-
ment of the constitutional model of separation of powers;
one that should be instructive whenever the President
claims to possess inherent power to act unilaterally
without explicit constitutional warrant or congressional
authorization.
3. Treaty Termination Hearings
The hearings on treaty termination held by the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee on April 9, 10, and 11,
1979278 and the Senate resolution concerning the appro-
priate role of the Congress in treaty termination2 7 9 to-
gether form a third important source of constitutional
law by lawmakers instead of judges. As mentioned above,
the Committee had the benefit of advice from one of the
country's leading scholars in this area, Professor Hen-
kin, and it heard from a variety of witnesses on the
subject. In the parliamentary scuffle between Senator
276. 31 U.S,C, §§ 1301-1353 (1974).
277. For example, in the memorandum cited in note 275 supra,
Rehnquist wrote: "Of course, if the Congressional directives to
spend would interfere with the President's authority in any area
confided by the Constitution to his substantive direction and con-
trol, such as his authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces and his authority over foreign affairs, a situation would be
presented very different from the one before us." (emphasis sup-
plied).
278. See note 13 supra.
279. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
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Goldwater and Senators Church and Javits which followed
the vote of June 6 on the Byrd resolution, a crucial
point appears to have been overlooked. Although the
Carter administration witnesses and several witnesses
from prior administrations argued strenuously for presi-
dential hegemony over the entire process of treaty
termination, that position was unanimously rejected by
the Foreign Relations Committee and was repudiated to a
large extent in the resolution which a majority of the
Committee recommended that the Senate pass. The unani-
mous view of the Committee that the Congress has a right-
ful role to play in treaty termination should not have
been overlooked in the Goldwater litigation.
Now that the lawsuit has been decided, It is my
hope--and perhaps Professor Tribe's as well 2 0--that the
Senate will enact a resolution similar in language to
the resolution reported by the Church Committee in May
of 1979,281 with whatever amendments may be necessary to
effectuate meaningful participation by the Congress or
by the Senate in the process of treaty termination. In
light of Judge Gasch's treatment of the Dole-Stone Amend-
ment, if the Senate or the Congress means to be taken
seriously in the matter, it must include language which
is binding and obligatory in whatever legislation it may
choose to enact.2 8 2 This result did not come to pass
before the lawsuit was finally decided. But after ex-
tensive consultation among the principal Senators
280. "This case [Goldwater v. Carter] presents a danger that
the court will take advantage of the opportunity that Goldwater has
provided to enlarge the president's powers -- by holding, for ex-
ample, that the president is never required to secure congressional
approval before terminating any treaty. Many who believe that
President Carter stands on firm constitutional ground in this case
would not welcome such a holding--a holding which, of course, would
be the very opposite of the result Senator Goldwater seeks." Constitu-
tional Red Herring, supra note 54, at 16 (emphasis in original). It
is difficult to know how a court could enlarge the power which Profes-
sor Tribe ascribed to the President in his treatise on constitutional
law, L. Tribe, supra note 118, at 164-65; but presumably Tribe is now
to be numbered among those who, like Senator Goldwater, would not
welcome the expansive holding which the professor hypothesized.
281. For another view on the need of legislation in this
area, see Scheffer, supra: note 1, at 1005-1007.
282. Both the Dole-Stone Amendment, supra note 105 and the
resolution offered by Senator Goldwater and co-sponsored by 21
other Senators, use the hortatory "should" instead of the mandatory
"shall".
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involved in the treaty termination debate (Robert Byrd,
Harry Byrd, Goldwater, Church and Javits), Majority
Leader Robert Byrd announced dramatically on November
15, 1979 that he proposed that the Senate adopt an
amended version of the resolution offered by Senator
Harry Byrd on which the Senate took an initial vote on
June 6. The language proposed by Senator Robert Byrd,
and apparently acceptable to Senator Javits,2 8 3 stated
that: "It is the sense of the Senate that approval of
the United States Senate is required to terminate any
mutual defense treaty between the United States and
another nation. The Senate shall determine the manner
by whicit gives its approval to such proposed termina-
tion.,,4o
The plurality opinion written by Justice Rehnquist
and joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and
Stevens emphasized that the conflicting opinions of
Judge Gasch and of the appellate court on the merits of
the constitutional question in Goldwater were vacated.285
Consequently, both the Executive and the Congress have
been left with no legal precedent to guide and inform
them as to the most intelligent way to terminate future
treaties. To be sure, the Carter administration, then
in a state of crisis over the prolonged holding of Ameri-
can hostages at our embassy in Teheran, was quick to in-
terpret the Supreme Court's December 13, 1979 decision
as a vindication of the President's claims.2 8 6 But if
Professor Tribe thought that Senator Goldwater and Presi-
dent Carter were engaged in "dubious battle,"1287 the
Supreme Court's decision in the case is a dubious victory
for the Executive. Nothing in the Court's terse per
curiam order, indeed nothing written in any of the con-
curring opinions, suggests that the two more politically
responsive branches of government do not have to continue
to struggle to find a way for both to participate mean-
ingfully in the treaty termination process. The Congress
and the Executive might choose to share in this process
through a generalized formula such as that found in the
War Powers Resolution or the Impoundment Act. A compro-
mise measure might be adopted authorizing congressional
283. 125 Cong. Rec. S16689-90 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1979).
284. Id. at S16684.
285. 100 S. Ct. at 538 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
286. See 16 Weekly Comp. of Pres, Doc, 345 Cyeb. 19, 1980),
287. See note 53 supra.
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participation in treaty termination only with respect to
certain types of treaties (which could be identified
either specifically by name or generically by category)
or only prospectively with respect to future treaties.
If some such generalized formula cannot be agreed upon
by the Congress and the Executive, the Senate could al-
ways decline to give its advice and consent to the rati-
fication of any future treaty that did not provide for
the approval of the Senate or by both Houses of the Con-
gress before the treaty could be terminated. Proponents
of congressional participation in treaty termination,
however, will have to attend carefully to the need for
some play in the joints. For, as Professor Henkin and
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have reminded
us through the substitute resolution which the Professor
helped draft and which the Committee reported to the
Senate in June 1979, there are some circumstances under
which congressional participation in treaty termination
would be unnecessary. By the same token, opponents of
any form of congressional participation in treaty termi-
nation will have to bear in mind that, after Goldwater,
they have neither legal precedent to cite as authority
nor a consensus in the Congress as a comfortable fall-
back position in support of their view. To the contrary,
the group in the Congress that has given the most serious
consideration to the treaty termination issue, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, unanimously repudiated the
position maintained by President Carter's attorneys
throughout the Goldwater litigation: that the Executive
has exclusive and plenary control over the entire process
of treaty termination. In any event, one may safely con-
clude after Goldwater that the more politically respon-
sive branches of government have only begun the process
of searching for an effective way of sharing in the
important policy decisions involved in the unmaking of
a treaty.
V. THE POLICY QUESTION: STRUCTURING POPULAR
PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC POLICY FORMATION
One of the reasons the treaty termination case was
not a "constitu ional red herring," as Professor Tribe
would have it,288 is that it raised an important question
of how the people are best represented in our republic.
288. Constitutional Red Herring, supra note 54, at 16.
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To be sure, the United States Congress is not a New Eng-
land town meeting, nor is the town meeting model of
democracy the most apt way of conducting the complicated
global policies which arise in the making and unmaking of
treaties. On the other hand, the assertion that the
President alone has the power to terminate any treaty he
finds impolitic reduces the ability of the people to
participate meaningfully in the formation of our foreign
policy. For if a first term President were to terminate
a treaty which enjoyed widespread support, the only
opportunity for popular response to such an act would be
to vote him out of office in the next presidential elec-
tion. This remedy would, of course, be unavailable in
the case of a second term President. If, however, the
Senate or the Congress were a vital structural component
in treaty termination, the popular will might be heard
more effectively. Foggy Bottom is not necessarily a bet-
ter listening post for the voice of the people on foreign
affairs than is Capitol Hill. If the Congress is to be
regarded as a significant constitutional instrumeht
through which the people might voice their own opinions
concerning major issues of United States' policy, its
role will have to be delineated with as much care in the
treaty termination area as has been shown in the War
Powers Resolution and the Impoundment Control Act.
Congressman Norman Lent has pointed out that Presi-
dent Carter's decision to terminate the mutual defense
treaty with the ROC raised a "most disturbing question:
Will Israel be abandoned just as casually [as the ROCI?"2 8 9
Congressman Lent's question reflected not simply the con-
cern of one or two of his constituents. It reflected the
public declaration of the Israeli Government: "Israel
must give thorough consideration to the U.S. decision
about Taiwan and reconsider Washington's ability to main-
tain its obligations under its agreements and treaties
with other nations."
2 90
To be sure, the Carter Administration, which
struggled long and hard to achieve the breakthrough of
the Camp David accords and which has actively pursued
many avenues to peace in the Middle East, is not likely
to effectuate any major change in our commitments to the
safety and security of Israel as the search for peace
289. 125 Cong. Rec. FI01 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979).
290. As quoted in id.
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continues. But neither Israel nor its friends in this
country can be certain that this commitment will remain
secure in the years ahead. This point is easily made
merely by examining the range of policy perspectives
adopted by three of the contenders for the Republican
nomination to the presidency in 1980. George Bush,
former head of the United States liaison office in Peking,
without mentioning Israel specifically, criticized Presi-
dent Carter for "renouncing a treaty with an ally [the
ROCI without cause or benefit." 2 9 1 It would seem unlike-
ly that Bush would seek to terminate the friendship of
this nation with Israel. In late 1979, however, John
Connally, then still a presidential candidate, made a
campaign speech which raised that very possibility.
2 9 2
Ronald Reagan has not indicated that he would take any
action to jeopardize our relationship with Israel, but
he has, of course, adopted an "America first" mentality
on the energy crisis and has publicly denounced the bi-
partisan efforts of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter adminis-
trations to negotiate and ultimately to ratify the Pana-
ma Canal treaty. Consistent with the position adopted
by President Carter's attorneys throughout the GoZdwater
litigation, could not Governor Connally have dramatically
altered our relations with Israel had he pursued and
achieved the Presidency? And could not Governor Reagan
unilaterally repudiate or terminate the Panama Canal
treaty? This prospect is acknowledged by at least one
supporter of President Carter's decision to terminate
the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC, Professor Alpheus
Thomas Mason, for whom an absolute presidential power
over treaty termination has "awesome implication[s]." 2 9 3
Before we adopt a de facto constitutional order which
gives complete control over treaty termination to the
incumbent of the Oval Office and to his experts in
Foggy Bottom, I think we need to think long and hard
about ways not only of allowing our elected representa-
tives in the Congress to have some say about the termina-
tion of long-standing alliances throughout the world, but
also of insuring effectually that through them the voice
of the people will be heard.
291. "For the first time in history a peacetime American
government has renounced a treaty with an ally without cause or
benefit.... We gave all and got nothing.,., We are simply
diminishing U.S. credibility around the world." As quoted in
i d. at E102.
292. See Editorial, John ConnaZy, Weakling, 181 The New
Republic 5-6 (October 27, 1979).
293. Mason, What It Takes To Sink A Treaty, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 29, 1979, as cited in Treaty Termination, supra note 13,
at 588.
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CONCLUSION
In the final chapter of Foreign Affairs and the
Constitution, Professor Henkin wrote of the need to ex-
plore new ways of achieving better collaboration and
cooperation between the Congress and the Executive in
conducting our foreign affairs. Trusting that the con-
stitutional reflections which I have put forward here
will be understood as an attempt to foster such colla-
boration, I would like to conclude by making Henkints
words my own: The quest must be for more and better
cooperation, consultation, accommodation, by better
legislative modi vivendi et operandi. Vietnam, in parti-
cular, persuaded many that separating the authority to
go to war from the authority to use other means of
foreign policy has proved, or has become, unworkable,
and that there is need to develop and improve institu-
tions and procedures to mitigate the deficiencies of that
constitutional conception. Here "checks"--as by giving
one branch a veto on the other--do not work very well.
The need is for built-in "balances," for arrangements and
procedures that will assure appropriate roles for both in
the making of foreign policy. The Executive must learn
to conduct foreign relations with less secrecy and grea-
ter responsibility. Congress must have a timely, honest,
meaningful role, and the flow of information to fulfill
it. Congress's part cannot be equal to the President's,
but the constitutional conception (as well as the impul-
sions of a democratic foreign policy) suggest that the
degree and kind of congressional participation should
increase as the means of foreign policy begin to include
uses of force and to approach a national commitment to
war, and as the cost of policy begins to loom large in
the competition for national resources. But Congress
will have to assert and demand a role. "Only Congress
itself can prevent power from slipping through its
fingers."U294
294. Henkin, supra note 91, at 279-80. The internal citation
is from Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown, 343 U.S.
at 654.

